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The advancement in networking technologies creates new opportunities for
computer users to communicate and interact with one another. Very often, these
interacting parties are strangers. A relevant concern for a user is whether to trust
the other party in an interaction, especially if there are risks associated with the
interaction.
Reputation systems are proposed as a method to establish trust among strangers.
In a reputation system, a user who exhibits good behavior continuously can build
a good reputation. On the other hand, a user who exhibits malicious behavior will
have a poor reputation. Trust can then be established based on the reputation
ratings of a user. While many research efforts have demonstrated the effectiveness
of reputation systems in various situations, the security of reputation systems is
not well understood within the research community. In the context of trust estab-
lishment, the goal of an adversary is to gain trust. An adversary can appear to
be trustworthy within a reputation system if the adversary has a good reputation.
Unfortunately, there are plenty of methods that an adversary can use to achieve a
good reputation. To make things worse, there may be ways for an attacker to gain
an advantage that may not be known yet. As a result, understanding an adversary
is a challenging problem. The difficulty of this problem can be witnessed by how
researchers attempt to prove the security of their reputation systems. Most prove
security by using simulations to demonstrate that their solutions are resilient to spe-
cific attacks. Unfortunately, they do not justify their choices of the attack scenarios,
and more importantly, they do not demonstrate that their choices are sufficient to
claim that their solutions are secure.
In this dissertation, I focus on addressing the security of reputation systems
in a decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. To understand the problem, I define
an abstract model for trust establishment. The model consists of several layers.
Each layer corresponds to a component of trust establishment. This model serves
as a common point of reference for defining security. The model can also be used
as a framework for designing and implementing trust establishment methods. The
modular design of the model can also allow existing methods to inter-operate.
To address the security issues, I first provide the definition of security for trust
establishment. Security is defined as a measure of robustness. Using this definition,
I provide analytical techniques for examining the robustness of trust establishment
methods. In particular, I show that in general, most reputation systems are not
robust. The analytical results lead to a better understanding of the capabilities of
the adversaries. Based on this understanding, I design a solution that improves the
robustness of reputation systems by using accountability. The purpose of account-
ability is to encourage peers to behave responsibly as well as to provide disincentive
for malicious behavior.
The effectiveness of the solution is validated by using simulations. While
simulations are commonly used by other research efforts to validate their trust es-
tablishment methods, their choices of simulation scenarios seem to be chosen in an
ad hoc manner. In fact, many of these works do not justify their choices of simu-
lation scenarios, and neither do they show that their choices are adequate. In this
dissertation, the simulation scenarios are chosen based on the capabilities of the ad-
versaries. The simulation results show that under certain conditions, accountability
can improve the robustness of reputation systems.
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The term, “trust management”, was coined by Blaze in [12] to refer to the
problems of formulating security policies, security credentials, verifying whether par-
ticular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, and deferring trust to third
parties. Policies define sets of conditions in which trust can be established. These
conditions are typically expressed in policy languages, such as PolicyMaker [12] and
KeyNote [11]. A principal can gain trust by satisfying the policies. Satisfaction of
policies is usually achieved by presenting the required credentials and by proving
ownership of the credentials to the policy verifier. To prevent mistrust, it is impor-
tant that a principal is not able to obtain any credentials that he is not entitled to.
Despite the importance of credentials attainment, it is seldom addressed in trust
management research. In fact, credential attainment is not listed as a component
of trust management by Blaze. This is because the domain of trust management is
often applied to organizations where credentials are created and distributed offline.
For example, an organization can be described by a hierarchy of roles. These roles
represent the authorities within an organization. The role of a member within the or-
ganization serves as a member’s credential by defining what a member is authorized
or not authorized to do. In such organizations, trust is closely related to authority.
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A member with authority over some actions is said to be trusted on those actions.
To illustrate, consider a bank, where an accounts manager may be authorized to
approve loans below a certain amount, say, $2000. A trust management policy
language can describe this policy by asserting that for a request to transfer any
amount that is less than $2000 to a client, then the request must be digitally signed
by any bank employee whose role is accounts manager. This essentially translates
the problem of trust establishment into the problem of authentication. The policy
verifier must authenticate that the request originates from an accounts manager.
Authentication within an organization can be easily addressed by the use of public
key cryptography, such as RSA [60], and key management solutions [36, 83, 23]. For
example, by using X.509 public key certificates[36] to bind public keys to identities,
one can use public key cryptographic techniques to prove his identity by demon-
strating his knowledge of the private key that corresponds to the public key in the
certificate.
With the proliferation of the Internet, many computer users are able to interact
with one another over the Internet. Very often, these interactions involve strangers.
When strangers interact, a valid question to ask is how can one user trust another
user. This is especially crucial if the misplacement of trust results in substantial
losses. For example, in an online auction, the act of bidding reflects the act of
placing trust on the seller to deliver the goods after collecting the payment. If
a bidder chooses to buy from a malicious seller, the seller may not deliver after
collecting the payment, resulting in monetary loss for the bidder. Since the Internet
is an open environment where almost anyone can participate, establishing trust
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on the Internet is a greater challenge as compared to establishing trust within an
organization. The first challenge is the value of identity. An identity within an
organization can be mapped into a role and its associated authority within the
organization. The role and authority information can decide the set of actions that
a principal is trusted to perform. On the Internet, the users are usually free to choose
any pseudonym to represent themselves. Pseudonyms are problematic [25] as they
do not convey information that can be used to judge the trustworthiness of principals
behind the pseudonyms. Moreover, pseudonyms are not secure since anyone can pick
any pseudonym to represent himself and can easily change pseudonyms when things
go bad.
The second challenge is the security of earning credentials. Within an orga-
nization, credentials are obtained offline. For example, employees earn credentials
through actual job performances that lead to promotions. On the Internet, a com-
mon credential is reputation. Popular Internet applications, such as e-commerce
applications (eBay 1, Amazon2), discussion sites (Stack Overflow3), product re-
views (Epinions4) and crowd sourcing application (Mechanical Turk5), rate their
participants based on their behaviors. Reputation serves as a way to judge the
trustworthiness of a principal locally, based on the principal’s past history of online
activities within an Internet application. While the use of online activities to estab-







security measures are essential to ensure that adversaries cannot manipulate various
computing resources so as to inflate their reputation artificially.
The third challenge is due to the lack of centralized administrative supports
on some Internet applications. These are typically applications that are built on de-
centralized and self-organized architectures, such as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks.
Within an organization, a principal may abuse his authority by performing actions
that bring harm to the organization (commonly known as the Byzantine Generals
problem [42]). There are measures that an organization can fall back on should
such events happen. For example, organizations can make use of audit trails and
other legal means to protect themselves. However, such measures require some
administrative and enforcement efforts which may not be present on decentralized
Internet applications. For example, the use of pseudonyms means that to prosecute
a malicious user, there must be some administrative efforts to link pseudonyms to
their corresponding physical identities. Given the interesting challenges of decen-
tralized environments, this dissertation is devoted to addressing the security of trust
establishment in decentralized environments.
With the shift of computing interests towards the Internet, the traditional
means of establishing trust for an organization through trust management are no
longer sufficient. While various methods to establish trust [4, 59, 28] have been
used, the security consequences are not well understood, as explained later. This
dissertation attempts to address the security issues of trust establishment by defining
and improving security in the context of trust establishment.
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1.1 Research Problems
The main theme of this dissertation is to address the security problems arising
from trust establishment. The concept of security is not well understood within the
trust research community. This can be observed by the interpretation of security in
different papers in the literature. For example, security is interpreted as authenti-
cation in [9, 19, 79], preventing collusion among malicious participants in [44, 40],
maintaining privacy in [55], access control in [72], preventing Sybil attacks [22, 64],
and as a probabilistic threat model in [6, 78]. Since security itself is a complex topic,
numerous differing interpretations among various research efforts are understand-
able. However, different opinions mean that different research efforts focus only
on a subset of security problems. This leads to concerns about how a particular
trust establishment method will perform when attacked by a method that has not
been considered by the researcher. For example, how will the method in [19] react
to collusion attacks described in [40]? This poses the following relevant research
questions:
• What are the semantics of security in the context of trust establishment?
• How does one determine whether a trust establishment method is secure?
• Is an existing trust establishment method secure against unanticipated at-
tacks?
In addition, research efforts that focus on trust establishments are typically
concerned with the aspects of computing and propagating trust [3, 4, 21, 28, 29, 32,
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47, 49]. While these research efforts address important issues of trust establishment,
security is not the primary focus. As such, if someone wishes to apply these methods
in a practical setting, how does one go about adding security to these existing
methods?
Reputation is a popular method for establishing trust in decentralized envi-
ronments. This popularity is due to the fact that reputation systems can be set up
without the need of centralized administration [19, 40, 72, 5]. Since this dissertation
focuses on trust establishment in decentralized environments, the use of reputation
as a means of establishing trust is of great interest to this research in particular, how
secure are reputation systems. Reputation systems pose some interesting security
problems, often involving the interference of human actions. For example, some
security problems are mentioned in [59], which include inaccurate reputation, as
well as malicious users masquerading as honest users by behaving well to establish
good reputations prior to their malicious activities. In addition, the challenges of
trust establishment presented in the previous section adds to the security concerns
of reputation systems.
Besides security, trust establishment itself is a complex topic, with a number of
different methods for establishing trust described in the survey [31]. Most research
efforts only focus on one aspect of trust establishment. For example, research on
reputation systems [59] focuses solely on using reputation for trust establishment
and nothing else. Given that different trust establishment methods have different
strengths and weaknesses, designing a trust establishment solution based on the
composition of various methods may lead to a better solution since different methods
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may complement each other. For example, one problem with reputation systems is
the honesty of the people providing feedback [58]. Therefore, combining reputation
systems with a solution that promotes honesty and discourages dishonesty may lead
to better results. This leads to the problem of how one can design a system that
allows different methods to be composed.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation addresses the research problems mentioned in the previous
section. By seeking answers to the above problems, this dissertation contributes
towards better understanding of trust establishment and security. In the area of
secure trust establishment, the contributions include precise definition of security,
as well as techniques for identifying and solving security problems. The contributions
can be listed in detail as follows:
1. Model for trust establishment. Before exploring the meaning of security in the
context of trust establishment, it is necessary to have a common understand-
ing of trust establishment. With numerous research efforts, such as [47, 4, 40],
focusing on specific computation aspects of trust establishment, the model de-
fines a generic framework for trust establishment. More specifically, the trust
establishment model abstracts the process of trust establishment by breaking
it down into simpler components. The components are stacked up to form
a layered model. Each layer interacts with the adjacent layers by providing
services to the upper layer and consuming services from the bottom layer.
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This model is similar to the OSI model for networking which abstracts the
networking process into seven layers, where the specifics of each layer are left
to the individual protocol designers and implementers. Taking the same ab-
stract approach to trust establishment has its advantages. First, the model
captures the essential components of trust establishment, rather than focusing
on specific aspects of trust establishment. This provides a common definition
when trust establishment is discussed. Second, the model provides a context
in which security can be defined. Third, just like how the OSI networking
model provides a framework for developers to implement networking solu-
tions, the trust establishment model provides the framework for implementing
trust establishment solutions, including the ability to compose various specific
methods together.
2. Security definition. Security for trust establishment can be defined on two
levels. The first level defines security in the authentication sense. To establish
trust in a principal, the principal and the credentials owned by the principal
must first be identified. The second level defines security in the semantic
sense. Given that the purpose of trust establishment is to distinguish between
honest and malicious principals, a trust establishment method is said to be
secure if it is capable of performing this task with a high rate of accuracy.
The first definition of security in terms of authentication has already been well
researched in the domain of systems and network security, resulting in solutions
for authentication, such as X.509 [36] and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [83],
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as well as credentials management, such as SDSI/SPKI [23]. Therefore, the
contribution of this dissertation is more towards the semantic sense of security.
To achieve this, this dissertation describes a formal approach to define security.
This security definition is then used to evaluate trust establishment solutions
to determine whether a particular solution is sufficiently secure.
3. Adversarial analysis. Security is informally described as the ability of a trust
establishment method to distinguish between honest and malicious principals.
The goal of a malicious principal is to make it difficult for a trust establish-
ment method to distinguish himself from an honest principal. Adversarial
analysis plays an important role in analyzing the security of a trust estab-
lishment method. Adversarial analysis attempts to discover ways in which an
adversary can gain trust successfully. This dissertation presents an analytical
method, ExBAN, as a technique for adversarial analysis. ExBAN is an exten-
sion of BAN logic [14]. BAN is a form of belief logic that is successfully used
in analyzing authentication protocols for loopholes. Unlike those previously
mentioned trust establishment research that define security based on specific
forms of attacks, ExBan analyzes security based on the flow of information.
This is because trust decisions are dependent upon the accuracy of available
information. An adversary can gain trust if the information leads the trust
decision maker to believe that the adversary is honest. Given an information
flow description of a trust establishment process, ExBAN provides a set of
inference rules to establish beliefs in the accuracy of the information. Ana-
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lyzing security based on the information flow model has the advantage that
it is independent of specific attacks. For example, in reputation systems, an
adversary may have a good reputation (which is one of the information used
for establishing trust) by behaving well for some time, or by colluding with
other adversaries as described in [40]. Although the attack methods may be
different, the results are the same that is, the reputation of an adversary is
artificially inflated. From the point of view of information flow analysis, these
attacks belong to the same class since they affect the same piece of informa-
tion and they result in the same consequence. If a new type of attack surfaces
in the future, the security properties of a trust establishment method will be
unaffected as long as the new attack belongs to a known class.
4. Improving the security of specific instances of reputation systems in decen-
tralized P2P networks. Decentralized networks are chosen as the trust estab-
lishment environment since they add to the challenge of securing reputation
systems, due to the absence of centralized authorities. Since reputation sys-
tems are commonly used, the dissertation focuses on improving the security
of trust establishment as well as to serve as a proof of concept for the above
mentioned contributions. Using ExBAN, the security problems with reputa-
tion systems are identified. Using the trust establishment model as the frame-
work, a solution is designed to mitigate the security problems. The solution
is to supplement reputation systems with accountability. The motivation of
using accountability is simple: the nature of an adversary is such that it does
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not want to be held accountable for its actions. Therefore, an adversary can
be distinguished from an honest principal by the willingness of a principal to
establish accountability. Accountability can be established through different
means, such as trading some form of privacy in order to gain trust. Simulations
are performed to verify the effectiveness of using accountability to supplement
reputation systems.
1.3 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will provide an overview
of trust from various disciplines, as well as trust as a computational concept. This
includes research that addresses the computation, establishment and propagation
of trust. These will provide the necessary background for references to trust in this
dissertation. Since this dissertation also focuses on trust establishment using repu-
tation, Chapter 3 is devoted to the topic of the reputation system. In Chapter 3, I
review various existing reputation systems in decentralized networks and their de-
sign features. The chapter will also critique these reputation systems, in particular,
on security and validation (simulations) issues.
Chapter 4 defines trust establishment by presenting a layered model. The
chapter describes the details of each individual layer and how different existing meth-
ods fit into the model. The model can also serve as an implementation framework in
which existing methods can be composed to form a solution for trust establishment.
The model provides an insight into how security can be defined in the context of
11
trust establishment.
Security is always a concern in this dissertation. The concept of security is
first defined in Chapter 5. The chapter then presents ExBAN for analyzing the
security of a trust establishment method. The results of the analysis lead to the
understanding of how an adversary can gain trust. The focus is given to reputation
systems in decentralized networks, which will serve as a proof of concept.
With an understanding of an adversary’s capability in a reputation system,
Chapter 6 presents the use of accountability to improve the security of reputation
systems. The chapter will discuss how to establish accountability in decentralized
networks. To validate the effectiveness of using accountability for trust establish-
ment, simulations are performed to determine how the method works under different
scenarios. The simulations scenarios are based on the capabilities of an adversary.
The simulations demonstrate that the use of accountability can improve the security
of reputation systems and are presented in Chapter 7. In addition, the simulations
identify the conditions where the combination of reputation systems and account-
ability can achieve good performance with respect to security.
While this dissertation provides a new direction in the research of trust with
a focus on security, it opens up other research opportunities. Chapter 8 discusses
some potential for future research.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation, summarizing the research prob-





The study of trust spans many different fields, including sociology, psychology,
philosophy, economics and computer science. This is not surprising, given that trust
is a prominent feature of our everyday lives. This chapter reviews the various work
on trust. The objective is to provide an understanding on the topic of trust from
different disciplines so as to identify the important features of trust establishment.
2.2 The Meaning of Trust
Trust plays an important role in our daily lives. Therefore, the study of trust
is not restricted to the field of Computer Science. This section presents some of the
more influential works on trust.
2.2.1 Trust as Decision Making Under Risk
One of the earliest work on trust is by Deutsch [20]. In the words of Deutsch,
trust is a form of decision making under risk:
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1. the individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that
can lead to an event perceived to be beneficial (V a+) or to an event
perceived to be harmful (V a−);
2. he perceives that the occurrence of V a+ or V a− is contingent on the
behavior of another person; and
3. he perceives the strength of V a− to be greater than the strength of
V a+.
If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties, I shall say
he makes a trusting choice; if he chooses not to take the path, he makes
a distrustful choice.
When Deutsch stresses that the consequences of a negative outcome is stronger
than those of a positive outcome, he is suggesting that the trust decision maker has
to take considerable risk when deciding to trust. More importantly, this interpre-
tation means that there are no incentives (where V a+ is of greater strength) to
influence the decision maker to make a trusting choice. From the perspective of
security, an interesting question is: What happens when V a+ has greater strength
than V a−? If an individual can be nudged towards an ambiguous path through
incentives, then an adversary can influence the decision making process by offering
incentives. For example, in an online auction, if someone is in desperate need of
an item, then the person may feel the urge to bid for the item, regardless of the
seller’s reputation, especially when there are only a handful of sellers offering the
item or when the price is attractive. This view of trust provides insights to design
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trust establishment methods. The establishment of trust involves risks. For a trust
establishment method to be secure, the risks have to be reduced. One form of risks
reduction is to establish trust based on factors which adversaries have little or no
influence on.
2.2.2 Trust as a Means to Reduce Complexity
While Deutsch’s model defined trust as an act of making a choice under risk,
Luhmann views trust as a means to reduce the complexity of an environment [46].
From a sociological perspective, the society is very complex and a decision is influ-
enced by too many variables so that it is difficult to predict the outcome. Trust
provides a way to reduce the complexity of everyday life so that a society can func-
tion. For example, Luhmann argues that without trust, one would be unable to
get out of bed in the morning because the risk of doing so is high. To understand
Luhmann’s argument, consider the possibilities that can happen should one get out
of bed. Perhaps, the person may slip and fall, or should the person decide to step
out of the house, he faces the risk of being run over by a car. There are too many
other possibilities that it is not possible to be exhaustive. However, despite such
risks, most people are not bothered by them. This is because the likelihood of such
possibilities is too low to affect a person’s decision to get out of bed. By getting
out of bed, a person implicitly trusts that such bad things will not happen. For
example, the person trusts the skills of other drivers, so that they will not run him
down. In this case, trust reduces the complexity of making a decision.
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This definition of trust is often used in security. For example, the issue of
binding an identity to a public key is a complex problem since it is difficult to verify
that a public key actually belongs to an individual. The complexity of this problem
is reduced by using trust. In a centralized model, all principals trust a hierarchy of
authorities who certify the identity and key bindings. Even in a decentralized model
such as PGP, a web of trust is used to reduce the complexity of the binding issue.
The problem of trust in a decentralized model is more interesting because in the
absence of authorities, all individuals have to decide for themselves who to trust.
According to this aspect of trust, trust is often established in complex en-
vironments. To model trust as a computational model, it is necessary to abstract
complex environments into simpler components. The abstractions have to be simple
such that it is computationally feasible to compute trust. At the same time, care
has to be taken to prevent over simplification to the extent that security problems
are hidden by the abstractions. Therefore, designing trust establishment methods
is a challenging task that requires the maintenance of a delicate balance between
abstraction and security.
2.2.3 Trust as a Form of Expectation
Barber views trust as an aspect of social relationships and as some form of an
expectation about the future [8]. Barber defines trust to exhibit:
1. expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural and moral social
orders,
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2. expectation of “technically competent role performance”,
3. expectation that partners in interaction will “carry out their fiduciary obli-
gations and responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain situations to place
others’ interests before their own”.
Barber’s definition of trust is based on competence as evaluated by standards
defined by the society. For example, a degree from an accredited university is
accepted in many societies as a measure of competence in a specific field of study.
There is an expectation that the degree holder is capable of demonstrating certain
expertise.
In addition, Barber’s definition also includes trust in authorities. Authorities
are expected to carry out certain duties. For example, a law enforcer is empowered
to uphold the laws and is expected to perform this duty faithfully. On the Internet,
certificate authorities are trusted for certifying the binding between an identity and
a public key. This trust can also be translated into a form of expectation, where
the authorities are expected to discharge their duties, such that the bindings can be
taken as the truth.
Reputation is often used as a measure of competence in our society. For
example, a business that can demonstrate its competence to its customers, such
as by offering good and reliable services, will result in having a good reputation.
Therefore, when someone is in need of a particular service, the reputations of the
various service providers are often solicited. This is also why businesses spend a lot of
resources in building up their brand names. On the Internet, the use of reputation
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is a popular way for trust establishment. This is especially so for decentralized
applications where other forms of measures of competency are absent.
The definition of trust as a form of expectation relies upon the presence of
institutionalized trust [38]. Institutionalized trust refers to the recognition of some
members and organizations within a society as authorities on certain subjects and
placing trust in the authorities. The trust in authorities can be extended to other
members of a society when the authorities delegate trust to these members. For ex-
ample, the trust in a certificate authority, CA, is delegated to the certificates issued
by the certificate authority, as well as certificates issued by other certificates author-
ities whom CA trusts. The presence of institutionalized trust and the delegation of
trust is important for establishing trust in a society. By trusting (institutionalized
trust) a relatively small set of members of a society, the institutionalized trust can
be propagated to other members of the societies, allowing one to trust a larger set
of members of the society. However, a security problem with this model is it works
only if the institutionalized trust is strong. For example, a corrupted authoritative
figure may accept bribes not to discharge his duties faithfully. This not only results
in misplacing trust in the corrupted authority, but also results in misplacing trust
on other undesirable members of the society due to the delegation of trust. The use
of reputation on the Internet can be vulnerable to this problem if online adversaries
can manipulate their own reputations. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, trust decisions
have to be dependent on factors that are not within the control of the adversaries.
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2.2.4 Trust as Probability
Gambetta [26] presents trust as a subjective probability that an agent can use
to assess whether another agent will perform a particular action. This assessment is
done before one can monitor such action, or one may not even have the capability
to observe such action. Moreover, the assessment can affect an agent’s own choice
of action. Since trust is treated as a probability, Gambetta uses values in the range
of 0 to 1 to represent trust.
The interpretation of trust as a probability provides a direct way to repre-
sent trust computationally. For example, works such as [6, 78] model trust as a
probabilistic threat model. However, from the perspective of security, the use of
probability can be problematic if an adversary can adjust his behavior such that
the probability distribution function can assign a high probability (trust) to the
adversary.
2.3 Computational Trust
Given the rich interest in trust in computer applications, an immediate prob-
lem is to define a model to represent trust as a computational concept. The previous
section introduces different perspectives about trust. While these definitions vary,
they are all valid forms of trust. In fact, these differing forms of trust may com-
plement one another. For example, while Deutsch’s definition deals with the act of
making choices, it does not explain the motivations behind the choices. This may be
explained by Barber’s or Gambetta’s definition, where the measure of competence
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or subjective probability analysis may influence the decision making process. Given
the potential synergy when different aspects of trust work together, a computational
trust model should encompass these different aspects.
Perhaps, one of the most influential works in computational trust is Marsh’s
Ph.D dissertation [47]. Marsh’s motivation is to develop a way for interacting agents
to establish trust among themselves. To do so, Marsh considers different aspects
of trust amongst research efforts mentioned previously. Marsh’s representation of
trust can be described as:
Tx(y, α) = Utility(α)× Impt(α)× T̂x(y), (2.1)
where α represents the situation, while x and y represent the trustor and the trustee
respectively.
Marsh calls Tx(y, α) the situational trust, which is how much x trusts y in
situation α. Utility(α) and Impt(α) measure the utility and importance of the
situation α respectively, while T̂x(y) is an estimation of the trustworthiness of y.
The utility and importance can be interpreted as a measure of V a+ and V a− in
Deutsch’s work.
T̂x(y) is estimated by considering the previous actions of y in identical or
similar situations. To do so, it is necessary to maintain knowledge about y’s previous
activities. Assuming that each of y’s previous actions can be mapped into a trust
rating in the range of [−1, +1), Marsh suggests different ways to obtain T̂x(y),
depending on x’s disposition. If x is an optimist, x selects the maximum rating
from the history as the trust estimate, and conversely, x selects the minimum rating
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if x is a pessimist. A realist computes the average of the ratings as the trust estimate.
Situational trust is defined as the value of the trust estimate, weighted by
the utility and importance of the situation. Utility is based on the expected utility
theory in economics [73]. Marsh measures the utility of the situation as the mean
of the utility of all possible outcomes. The utility of an outcome measures the
satisfaction derived from the outcome. It can, for example, be based on the costs
and benefits analysis for the outcome. Marsh uses values in the range of [−1, +1]
to represent utility. The importance of a situation ranges from [0, +1]. Marsh does
not consider negative importance. In fact, situations of negative importance can
be treated as the opposite of situations with positive importance. For example,
Impt(¬α) = 1 represents the concept that situation α is not important.
Marsh explains the difference between utility and importance as the difference
between objective and subjective measures. Utility is an objective measure, that
can be computed or estimated, such as by using costs and benefits analysis. On the
other hand, importance is a subjective judgment of the situation by an individual
and may vary in two identical situations at different times. To illustrate, Marsh
uses the example of playing a dice game. The utility of playing the game can
be measured by the amount of prize money. The importance of playing may be
low, especially if the odds are stacked against the player. However, if the player
believes that the odds are in his flavor, perhaps by cheating, then the importance of
playing increases while the utility remains the same. The role of importance in the
definition of situational trust is to represent the fact that the subjective judgment
of a principal may change, even when faced in identical situations. The addition of
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importance to the rationality of utility provides the formalism with more prescriptive
and descriptive power. From the perspective of security, this is a potential pitfall
that an adversary can exploit.
Having established the situational trust, the next step is to decide whether
trust can be established. Marsh computes a cooperation threshold to determine
this. If the situational trust is above the threshold, trust is established. In the
multi-agent model, the establishment of trust is defined by the cooperation behavior









(Competencex(y, α) + T̂x(y))× Impt(α)
. (2.3)
The difference between these two models is the role of importance. Formula 2.2
models the situation where the more important the situation is, the more the amount
of situational trust is required for cooperation to take place. Therefore, increasing
the importance of the situation raises the cooperation threshold. On the other hand,
Formula 2.3 models the situation where the more important the situation is, the
more one needs to get it done. Therefore, in this case, increasing the importance of
the situation lowers the cooperation threshold to facilitate cooperation. The second
model is less attractive with respect to security since the importance of an event
actually makes it easier for trust to be established.
The cooperation threshold models demonstrate an insight into trust establish-
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ment. The threshold models show that trust establishment is achieved by main-
taining a balance between risk, competence of y and situational trust in y. Situ-
ations with high risk require greater competence and/or situational trust to lower
the cooperation threshold. Conversely, low risk situations are more tolerant to less
competence and/or situational trust.
The values for both risk and competence are within the range [0, 1]. Evalu-
ating these values depend on an agent’s past experiences and knowledge. Marsh
suggests different methods for measuring these values depending on the availabil-
ity of experiences and knowledge. Clearly, learning is important to provide more
accurate measures for similar situations in the future.
While Marsh provides a thorough model for modeling trust establishment, the
model itself is largely based on heuristics and upon careful study, reveals problems
in some circumstances due to the heuristic nature of the model. An obvious problem
is when Competencex(y, α) = −T̂x(y) in Formula 2.2. Marsh documents a list of
problematic values in [47]. Despite these problems, the value of Marsh’s model is
that it encompasses the definition of trust from different fields of study. Marsh’s
model is also flexible, as witnessed by the use of different cooperation threshold
models. As a matter of fact, since the model is based on heuristics, one can even
design different heuristics for the various components of the model to adapt to
different situations.
Besides Marsh’s work, there are several research efforts in computational trust.
In centralized environments where roles and authorities are clearly defined, the most
common method is trust management [12]. Trust management involves the manage-
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ment of digital credentials and policies. The main application of trust management
is access control. The role of access control is to determine whether a subject x can
access object y. The object y can be thought of as files with read, write or execute
access rights. 1 To determine the access rights of x to y, x must have the necessary
credentials as dictated by the access policies to y. The credentials of x may be
defined by x’s role within an organization, or by some digital artifacts issued by
some authorities that attest to the capabilities of x, Examples of credentials include
X.509 certificates [36] and PGP [83] for public key and identity binding, as well as
SDSI/SPKI [23] for an authority to delegate responsibilities.
Credentials constitute one part of trust management. The other component
of trust management is trust policies. Policy languages, such as PolicyMaker [12],
KeyNote [11], TPL [37] and Referee [17] allows the definition of trust policies which
specify the requirements, in terms of credentials, for trust to be established. The
formulation of trust policies is very similar to access control. The role of access
control is to determine the specific set of rights a principal has over an object. As
a result, research in access control [33, 74] is applicable.
The work in trust management is extended to allow trust establishment across
organizations. The namespace binding feature of SDSI/SPKI credentials allows one
to identify the origin of the credentials. Trust establishment between two different
organizations has been described in [79] where the types of inter-domain (organiza-
tions) trust relationships are explained.
1An action, such as the transfer of funds into an account can be thought of as executing a
program that does the actual transfer.
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To facilitate the satisfaction of trust policies between two organizations, trust
negotiation [76, 75, 77] allows two parties to come into agreement on the set of
credentials that are required for trust to be established.
In open, decentralized environments, papers such as [9, 44] deal with estab-
lishing trust in public keys, while works such as [3, 4, 21, 28, 29, 32, 49] suggest
different approaches to compute trust in virtual communities. These works on trust
establishment can be classified into two general approaches: reputation [59] and
recommender [57] systems.
Reputation and recommender systems are popular methods for establishing
trust. In reputation systems, each principal has a reputation that estimates the
trustworthiness of the principal. The reputation of a principal is typically computed
based on the principal’s past behavior.
Recommender systems are often used in applications where participants can
provide opinions on some subject, such as opinions about books, movies [29], restau-
rants and consumer products. These opinions serve as recommendations from the
participants. In recommender systems, trust in a principal is determined by whether
the principal’s opinions are useful. Therefore, recommender systems establish trust
between two principals by measuring the semantic distance between them. The
semantic distance measures how similar these two principals are in terms of their
opinions. Empirical results from [81, 82] have demonstrated that existence of corre-
lation between trust and user similarity where opinions from principals with smaller
semantic distances are more trusted.
Here I noted some of the popular research on trust establishment. A deeper
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study of the operations of these trust establishment methods reveals that these
methods can be abstracted into a two-step generic trust establishment framework.
Using Marsh’s terminology, the first step involves the computation of situational
trust. The second step is to input the situational trust value into a decision function
to derive an outcome. In trust management, the situational trust is defined in
terms of credentials while the decision function is a policy checker that checks for
the satisfaction of trust policies. For reputation and recommender systems, the
situational trust is defined in terms of reputation ratings and semantic distances
respectively. The decision making function for both systems are threshold functions,
such as Marsh’s threshold functions.
2.4 Trust properties and trust relationship
Trust establishment results in the formation of the trust relationship between
at least two principals. Many research efforts have been devoted to the study of
trust relationships to understand the properties of trust, to allow reasoning with
trust and to propagate trust. Research on this topic leads to important results that
allow trust to be established among strangers on the Internet and open networks.
Since different research efforts define trust differently, it is not a surprise that
there is no universal agreement on a set of properties that trust relationships have
to adhere to. The basic property of trust that is widely accepted is that trust is
context sensitive. This is a simple property that can be observed from our daily lives.
For example, one may trust his doctor on medical advice, but may not necessarily
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trust the same doctor’s advice on the stock market. It is also generally agreed that
trust is not symmetric. That is, x’s trust in y may not be the same as y’s trust in
x. For example, trust relationships between parents and children, or trust between
managers and subordinates are clearly different.
An important aspect of trust establishment is the propagation of trust. This
allows trust in a set of entities to be extended to a greater set of entities. The delega-
tion of authorities mentioned previously is an example of trust propagation. Besides
delegation, the property of transitivity is useful for propagating trust relationships.
To illustrate, in Fig. 2.1, the solid arrows represent existing trust relationships be-
tween principals A,B, C and D. The labels on the arrows represent the trust level
between 0 to 1 inclusively. Due to the transitivity property, trust can be established
between A and C, and also between D and C, as shown by the dashed arrows.
There is still a remaining problem of deciding the level of trust. An example is the
“weighted” method: to compute the trust level between A and C, take the trust
level between B and C, weighted by A’s trust in B. As a result, A’s trust in C is
0.7× 0.8 = 0.56 and D’s trust in C is 0.3× 0.8 = 0.24.
Another relevant problem is how to aggregate trust values obtained from dif-
ferent paths. Consider the situation in Fig. 2.2. A can establish trust in C via two
paths: A → B → C and A → D → C. To obtain A’s trust level in C, A can
combine the trust rating from the two paths. For example, A may use the following:
Tik =
∑
j∈Adj(i) Tij × Tjk∑
j∈Adj(i) Tij
, (2.4)








Figure 2.1: Propagation of trust using transitivity property.
Figure 2.2: Aggregation of trust values from various trust paths.
tion 2.4, A’s trust in C can be computed as:




Despite the usefulness of the transitivity property, transitivity causes security
risk [16]. If x trusts y and y trusts another principal z, then x also trusts z. Due
to the transitivity property, y adds a trust relationship between x and z without
x’s explicit consent. Therefore, extra care must be taken when propagating trust
through transitivity. In fact, to avoid security risks, trust should not be propagated
via transitivity in most situations.
Recommendations [28, 80] is another method to propagate trust. If x trusts
y to recommend a principal for context c, and y recommends z, then x trusts z for
c. Strictly speaking, this is not a transitive trust relation, since two types of trust
are involved: x’s trust in y’s ability to make recommendation in context c, and y’s
trust in z to perform in context c. In fact, this form of propagation is similar to
delegation of trust. In the example, x delegates the task of making trust decision
for c to y.
In [39], Jøsang differentiates the difference between trusting passionate entities
with human-like capabilities and trusting rational entities that are basically systems.
He defines trust as a belief that a rational entity will resist malicious manipulation
or that a passionate entity will behave without malicious intent. While most work
focuses on trust establishment among passionate entities, Jøsang’s work provides
an important insight that it is equally important to trust rational entities. This is
evident in the prevalence of attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in software to gain
control of computer systems. Therefore, when establishing trust, it is also important
to verify that the computer system has not been compromised. Advances in Trusted
Computing technologies [2, 61, 66] and hardware based monitor [56] provide the tools
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to detect compromises in systems.
The security of trust propagation is addressed in some research, such as [44, 64].
If an adversary has established trust relationships with some principals, this trust
can be propagated to other principals, resulting in other principals trusting the
adversary. The authors of [44] design an algorithm that protects against keys that
have been compromised. In [64], the scheme provides an interesting method to
protect against the Sybil attack [22]. The Sybil attack is a form of attack when an
adversary creates multiple identities.
2.5 The role of trust in this dissertation
While there are various definitions of trust, the intention of this dissertation is
to be as generic as possible, such that the work can be applied to as many definitions
of trust as possible. Therefore, it is intentional that the work in this dissertation
does not provide a specific definition of trust. In general, trust can be defined as
follows:
Definition 1 Trust: Trust is a pairwise relationship between two principals, P and
Q, such that if P trusts Q, then P expects Q to behave in a competent behavior over
a period of time as defined by a specific context.
The above definition captures the notion that trust is a relationship between
two principals. This trust relationship describes a form of expectation that the
trustee behaves in a competent manner. Competent behavior is defined by a specific
context. Trust is also time sensitive. If P trusts Q at time t, it does not mean that
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P will trust Q at some point in time other than t.
Since this dissertation uses trust in a computational setting, trust must be
represented as a computational concept. An example of a computational represen-
tation of trust is Marsh’s work, which in turn, incorporates the definitions of trust
from various studies.
Marsh’s computational model captures the essential steps for trust to be es-
tablished. His model provides a basis for defining a trust establishment model in
the later part of this dissertation. In addition, the properties and types of a trust
relationship are relevant for analyzing the security of trust establishment.
Since this dissertation focuses on decentralized environments, the use of rep-
utation as a computational trust establishment is of great interest. In the later
chapters, reputation is used as an example, as well as the platform for performing
experiments. Due to the interest in reputation, an entire chapter, Chapter 3, is allo-
cated to discussing reputation. Despite the focus on reputation, the work presented





Reputation systems [59] describe a class of trust establishment methods that
primarily compute the reputation of a principal and utilize reputation to establish
trust. The reputation of a principal is typically rated according to the principal’s
past behavior. In general, a principal with good behavior leads to the increment of
the principal’s reputation rating, while bad behavior leads to the decrement of the
reputation rating. Over time, reputation provides a reflection of a principal’s past
history. A principal with a good reputation is more likely to be trusted since the
principal has demonstrated good behavior in the past. Therefore, reputation can
serve as an indication of how trustworthy the principal is.
According to [58], the reason why reputation works as a trust establishment
method is due to the expectation of reciprocity and retaliation in future transactions.
This means that a principal with a good reputation can expect to be rewarded in
future interactions, such as receiving more cooperation from other principals. On
the other hand, a principal with a bad reputation may be avoided by others in
future. In fact, research [7, 35, 45, 58] on the effect of reputation on online auction
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shows that sellers with low reputations typically get lower prices while sellers with
higher reputations can collect more earnings. This is because buyers are willing
to pay more for the perceived reliability and quality in services provided by sellers
with high reputations. The expectation of reciprocity and retaliation provides the
incentives and disincentives for a principal to exhibit trustworthy behavior.
The effectiveness of reputation systems relies on the quality of the feedback
provided. Because of this, a problem with a reputation system is that very often,
there is little incentive to provide feedback at the end of an interaction. The study
in [58] finds that about half of the buyers on eBay provide feedback. In addition,
fear of retaliation may discourage participants from providing negative feedback. In
some cases, a participant may be blackmailed by another who threatens to retaliate
with negative feedback. In [58], it is reported that on the average, about 1% of the
feedback received by a seller is negative. It is suggested that perhaps, this low rate
of negative feedback is due to the fear of retaliation. Another problem affecting the
quality of feedback is the honesty of the feedback providers. For example, a group
of sellers may work together to provide positive feedback to each other, resulting in
all members of the group having good reputations.
Identity is another problem affecting the effectiveness of reputation systems
[25]. Most reputation systems identify participants by their pseudonyms. However,
participants with bad reputations can register a new pseudonym to start with a clean
slate. As a result, newcomers may have to be distrusted, but on the other hand, if
newcomers are distrusted, it will be difficult for them to establish good reputations.
Some sites have specific measures to combat this problem. For example, eBay
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requires a valid credit card in order to set up an account. However, these measures
may not solve the problem completely. For example, a person with multiple credit
cards can still set up multiple accounts. Moreover, the threats of identity thefts may
render such measures ineffective.
3.2 Reputation Systems in Decentralized P2P networks
Decentralized P2P networks are widely used for sharing resources, such as
file sharing. In fact, there are several well known P2P file sharing applications
such as Napster [67], Gnutella [41], Freenet [43] and BitTorrent [18]. Given their
popularity, P2P networks make an interesting study for trust establishment in de-
centralized environments since the results of this research can potentially create a
huge impact. Moreover, there are many research efforts on using reputation to estab-
lish trust in P2P networks for resource sharing purposes [19, 40, 72]. This existing
research serves as interesting case studies for building secure trust establishment
methods. P2P resource sharing and online auctions share some common features
that make reputation systems the popular choice. Both applications involve inter-
actions among strangers. Besides that, the interaction patterns of both applications
can be abstracted into a common model that can be described as follows:
1. A resource requester submits a query for a resource.
2. The requester receives a set of resource providers who can provide the resource.
3. A trust establishment step where the resource requester has to decide which
provider to trust.
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4. The requester obtains the resource from the provider.
Given the similarity in the interaction model, reputation systems can be used to
help the resource requester determine which resource provider to trust.
While both applications share a similar interaction model, there is a major
difference between them in terms of infrastructure. Most Internet applications have
centralized administrations that provide the necessary services to support interaction
among different participants. For example, the administration supports items 1 and
2 of the interaction model by maintaining a directory of resource providers, and also
provides the communication linkage between the requester and the providers. The
administration also assists in supporting trust establishment by providing reputa-
tion computation and storage services. In contrast, such centralized administration
is absent from a decentralized network, with Napster being the rare exception. As a
result, the participants of a P2P network have to cooperate to provide services that
are similar to those found in applications with centralized administration. Support-
ing trust management is a big challenge, with problems involving the computation,
storage and dissemination of reputation. In the absence of a centralized admin-
istration, how can the individual peers aggregate their feedback to construct the
reputation of a particular peer? Where should reputation be stored, or more impor-
tantly, how can peers trust that the reputation storage has not been tampered with?
How can one peer retrieve the reputation of another peer efficiently? Finally, how
can one encourage peers to cooperate? Fortunately, there are numerous research
efforts that are devoted to answering some of the challenges. This section reviews
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some of these research results.
To address storage and retrieval of files, the P-Grid [5] provides a structure for
organizing information in a P2P network. On top of that, [68] protects the storage
by providing anonymity for the locations where files are stored. Since reputation is
stored in files, these methods can easily be used to store and retrieve reputation.
In addition, research efforts [19, 40, 72] attempt to resolve the problem of
computing reputation. In these schemes, each individual peer stores the feedback
of each peer it has interacted with. This feedback can be combined efficiently from
other peers in different ways.
In [19], the reputation of a provider is computed by a distributed polling
algorithm. The file requester polls the other peers in the network for their opinion of
a potential provider. Peers who receive the poll and who have previously interacted
with the potential provider can respond by sending a vote, which contains either a
positive or a negative response. The requester will make use of the votes to make
a decision on whether to download a file from the potential provider. The outcome
of the downloading will be used to rate the votes provided by the voters. This can
be used to identify peers who provide quality votes and peers that do not. Having
such information can help a peer decide which votes to give more weight to.
A prominent reputation system for P2P networks is the EigenTrust algorithm
[40]. Like the previous scheme, each peer maintains a set of local reputations of
peers it has previously interacted with. The EigenTrust algorithm is based on the
PageRank [54] algorithm used by the Google search engine to rank web pages. This
algorithm provides an efficient method to combine the local reputations stored in
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each peer to obtain the global reputation of a peer.
In [72], the authors provide an interesting perspective of trust by using access
control concepts. Each file is a protected resource in the P2P network. Each file
is assigned two access thresholds, which represent two aspects of evaluating trust.
The first aspect deals with how the host views the file requester (direct relationship)
while the second views the performance of the requester in the P2P network (indi-
rect relationship). To access a file, the requester has to satisfy these two threshold
values. The direct relationship is built on previous interactions between the host
and the requesting peer. This is computed based on how the host perceived the
trustworthiness of the requester and the requester’s contribution. The requester’s
contribution is computed based on the number of megabytes that had been trans-
ferred from the requester to the host peer. It captures the notion of whether the
host owes the requester any downloads. The indirect relationship evaluates other
peers’ opinions on the requester based on how much they trust the requester and
the amount of contribution made by the requester to these peers. The reputation
storage problem is addressed by each peer storing the recommendations it received
as well as the set of recommendations issued to other peers. A peer also maintains
a blacklist of peers who it believes to have committed malicious acts. A peer will
neither interact with peers in the blacklist nor recommend them. To access a file,
the requesting peer is responsible for submitting the recommendations from other
peers to the host, so that the host can compute the indirect relationship value. By
taking contributions of peers into account, this scheme provides incentives for peers
to share their files.
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To encourage peers to cooperate in sharing files and providing reputation,
incentives are often used. An example is seen in [72] where incentives are used to
encourage peers to share their files. In [78], the computation of reputation includes a
community context factor. This community context factor measures how active the
participant is in providing feedback. Whenever a peer provides feedback, the peer’s
community context factor improves, which in turn improves the peer’s reputation.
To deal with retaliation, [6] computes reputation based on the number of
complaints. Suppose p provides bad service to q and r. Both q and r issue a
complaint against p. To retaliate, p also issues complaints against q and r. p’s
reputation is defined as the number of complaints p has issued, multiplied by the
number of complaints filed against p. In this case, the reputation of p is 4. In this
scheme, a bigger reputation score represents less trustworthiness. A drawback of
this scheme is that peers who filed genuine complaints will result in an increment
of their reputations and hence make them less trustworthy. In this case, this is a
disincentive for peers to file complaints. In [55], the scheme protects the identity
of peers who provide feedback. By providing privacy, peers who provide negative
feedback are protected against retaliation.
3.3 Security issues in P2P Reputation Systems
The use of reputation systems to establish trust in P2P networks causes a
number of problems. A common problem is the lack of strong identity. In fact, a
majority of the research efforts mentioned in the previous section use pseudonyms as
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identities. The problem of using pseudonym has already been addressed earlier. An
exception is the work of [19], which uses the hash of a public key as the identity of
a peer. The use of public keys allows the peers to utilize authentication techniques
to identify each other and to defend against authentication types of attacks, such as
the man-in-the-middle attacks. However, this protocol is unable to protect against
malicious peers with good reputations. In this situation, at least one peer will have
to suffer from such attacker before the malicious act is discovered. When a malicious
peer is identified by a victim, the victim can vote against the malicious peer in the
future. Unfortunately, this research does not demonstrate the security properties
of the scheme, such as how malicious peers with good reputations can affect the
effectiveness of the reputation scheme.
The EigenTrust algorithm [40] addresses a variety of threat models, including
the simple model of a malicious peer working alone, as well as the more sophisti-
cated model of malicious collectives. A malicious collective comprises of malicious
peers that always provide inauthentic files. Members of a collective will assign
the maximum trust value to other members of the collective. Members of a ma-
licious collective can even camouflage their intentions by providing authentic files
in a certain fraction of cases when they are selected. The authors use simulations
to demonstrate how well the EigenTrust algorithm can resist against these adver-
saries. The EigenTrust method is shown to be resilient against a malicious peer who
works alone and has a certain degree of resilience against malicious collectives. The
simulations show that malicious collectives have the maximum impact when 50% of
the files provided are authentic. However, the effectiveness of the algorithm against
39
malicious collectives is due to the assumption of pre-trusted peers. The presence of
pre-existing trust among some of the peers is a feature of the PageRank algorithm
[54] which the EigenTrust algorithm is based on. It is unknown how EigenTrust
will fare in the absence of such pre-existing trust. Moreover, in decentralized en-
vironments such as P2P networks, it is unreasonable to assume that peers with
pre-existing trust are always present. Finally, the authors also simulate against the
threat model of two malicious collectives cooperating with each other. Members of
one group will always provide authentic files resulting in a good reputation. The
malicious peers in this collective will then use their good reputation to boost the
reputation of another collective. The simulation results show that this is a very ef-
fective way to attack the EigenTrust algorithm. Although a lot of attention is given
to address various threat models, a criticism of the EigenTrust work is that these
models seem to be derived in an ad hoc fashion. There is no explanation to show
that these chosen threat models are adequate in addressing the security concerns.
While the work on EigenTrust attempts to simulate against a variety of threat
models, there are some works that focus on a single aspect of security. For example,
the schemes [6, 55] are only interested in combating retaliation, and [72] is only
concerned with controlling access to resources. While these schemes do meet their
respective security objectives, their threat models are simplistic and inadequate




The task of establishing trust in a decentralized network is difficult. Security
adds to this challenge. Unfortunately, despite numerous efforts to address security,
there is no common consensus on what security actually is. This is shown by the
variety of different threat models in the research efforts, such as those mentioned
in the previous section. The lack of a common definition of security also makes
it difficult for one to determine whether a particular reputation system is secure
or not. For example, while [6] is secure against retaliation, the authors have not
demonstrated that this method is secure against other form of threats. Therefore,
there is a need to define a common notion of security where all trust establishment
methods can agree upon. This common definition can then be used to evaluate
the security of any trust establishment methods. The security definition should
preferably be independent of context, so that the definition can be applied not only
on reputation systems, but other trust establishment methods as well.
Once the definition of security is agreed upon, the next challenge is to devise
techniques to analyze the security of trust establishment methods. The primary
objective of such analysis is to understand the security problems, with the hope




The manner in which trust is established often depends on the context. For
example, if an authority is present, trust management techniques [12, 11] can be
used, whereas in the absence of an authority, the participating principals have to
make trust decisions on their own, based on some information.
In general, the context can be described by either a closed world or open
world model. In a closed world model, principals cannot participate freely. Instead,
principals have to go through some registration process in order to participate. For
example, in order to access a company’s network resources, a person needs to be
employed by that company. Each principal typically has a single digital identity
that can be mapped to a set of roles, which in turn defines a set of responsibilities.
Trust establishment decisions is typically dependent on the roles and responsibilities
of a principal.
In contrast, in an open world model, any principal can participate at any-
time. A common feature is the lack of a hierarchy of roles and authorities in this
model. Because of this, trust establishment cannot be dependent on the roles of the
principals. Although in theory, strong identities can be achieved through crypto-
graphic means, such as public key cryptography, in practice, weak identities, such
42
as pseudonyms are used. Many Internet applications such as social networks sites
or online auction sites, are examples of open world models. Trust management is
not suitable for the open world model due to the lack of centralized authorities
that dictate the policies for trust establishment. Therefore, many trust establish-
ment methods are based on behavior patterns or existing relationships (in social
networks).
This chapter presents an abstract trust establishment model that captures the
important components of trust establishment, regardless of the context (open or
closed world). Since the eventual goal is to be able to produce a common definition
of security, the abstract trust establishment model can serve as a common basis for
defining security.
4.1 Preliminary Trust Establishment Model
In Chapter 2, the establishment of trust is generalized into a two-step process:
the computation of situational trust and decision making. The computation of sit-
uational trust depends on the application context. As mentioned in the review of
existing research, situational trust can be computed using methods such as reputa-
tion, recommendation, credentials, utility, importance of the context, as well as the
trust disposition of the decision maker. Depending on the application context, one
or a combination of the above methods can be used for computing the situational
trust. The computation of situational trust constitutes the semantics of trust es-
tablishment. The semantics of a trust establishment process provides the reasons
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why trust can be established. For example, in a reputation system, the reason for
trusting a principal is that the principal has behaved well in the past.
The decision making step of a trust establishment process involves evaluating
the semantics of the trust establishment process. Using the reputation system as
an example again, the decision making step evaluates whether the situational trust
(reputation) of a principal is sufficient for trust to be established. For example, the
evaluation may simply be a threshold function, such as the functions introduced in
Marsh’s work. In addition, the evaluation step may be used for selection purposes.
For example, in a P2P file sharing application, it is possible that a resource requester
receives multiple responses. The requester can compute the situational trust of all
the peers who respond, and the evaluation process may select the peer with the best
reputation.
Since the measurement of situational trust requires information, the gathering
of information is an important part of the trust establishment process. Since infor-
mation is gathered over a noisy environment, such as the Internet, it is important
to consider the security of the information collected. The security of information is
traditionally defined in security research as: confidentiality, integrity and authen-
ticity. Confidentiality can be useful in protecting the contents of the information,
while integrity ensures that the information is not modified either intentionally or
unintentionally during transit. Authenticity identifies the source of the information
and provides non-repudiable evidence of the information origin. In a closed world
model, assuming the presence of authorities that uphold the rules for participation,
these security requirements are usually sufficient. However, in an open world model,
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non-repudiation becomes a challenge due to the lack of a centralized authority to
uphold rules and regulations. Therefore, even if one has non-repudiable evidence
that a principal makes certain claims, there is no authority to prosecute principals
who do not fulfill their claims.
Figure 4.1: An preliminary trust establishment model.
Based on the above observations, a preliminary model can be described by
Fig. 4.1. The trust establishment process can be thought of as a four layer model:
an evaluation layer on top supported by a semantic layer below, followed by the
authentication layer and finally, the primitive layer at the bottom.
At the top, the evaluation layer is simply a decision function, such as Marsh’s
cooperation threshold. It takes inputs from the semantic layer and compute a deci-
sion on whether to grant trust or not. It may also decide whom to trust.
The semantic layer is the reasoning engine behind trust establishment. The
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semantic layer deals with the measurements of situational trust. As mentioned
earlier, situational trust may be measured based on variety of factors, including risk,
utility, importance and reputation. Situational trust may also be inferred based on
trust propagation and aggregation rules.
The authentication layer provides some assurance on the integrity and au-
thenticity of information. If confidentiality is a concern, it can be provided through
encryption. In [39], Jøsang differentiates between trusting passionate entities with
human-like capabilities and rational entities that are basically systems. Authenti-
cation is designed to verify the identity of passionate entities and to provide non-
repudiable evidences about the information origin. In fact, many trust establishment
methods target at passionate entities. However, trusting rational entities are also
important because if a system is under the control of an adversary, the adversary can
have access to secrets, such as private keys, that allow the adversary to masquerade
the identity of an honest passionate entity. Therefore, the authentication layer may
also verify the integrity of the computer system, in particular, the integrity of the
application software. This can be done through remote attestation techniques such
as [61, 66] and a hardware based monitor [56].
The primitive layer is a set of sensors that gather information from the en-
vironment. These sensors may be physical devices such as network interfaces that
monitor network traffic, or they can be software processes that collect data over
the Internet. Besides gathering information externally, information may also be
obtained from local storage. Typically, local storage keeps information about past
experiences.
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Policies play an important role in trust establishment. In the trust establish-
ment model, each layer is supported by a set of policies. The primitive layer can be
supported by a set of policies that determine how to gather information, while the
authentication layer is supported by another set of policies that determine the use
of public keys. The policies at the semantic layer define situational trust, while the
policies at the evaluation layer can be used as a decision function selector, such as,
which decision function to use under which conditions.
The idea behind a layered-model approach is that each layer can be treated
as an individual module, with the lower layer providing inputs to the upper layer.
This form of modularity allows existing systems to inter-operate with each other.
For example, one can customize the semantic layer to estimate situational trust using
different methods (such as reputation), rather than the agent’s disposition method
as suggested by Marsh. The decision function (cooperation threshold model) at
the evaluation model can remain unchanged as long as the new estimation method
produces output within the range as required by the decision function. This is
illustrated in Fig. 4.2. In Fig 4.2a, the semantic layer determines situational trust
according to the trustor’s disposition as proposed by Marsh. In Fig 4.2b, the decision
function remains unchanged, but the semantic layer uses a reputation system to
determine situational trust. This gives a trust establishment designer the flexibility
to design solutions that can adapt to different contexts.
Another flexibility of the model comes from allowing composition of different
methods at the semantic layer. This is especially useful if different systems can com-
plement each other. For example, in [48], a recommender system is supplemented
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Figure 4.2: Example of how reputation systems can inter-operate with Marsh’s
model.
by a web of trust model to overcome the “cold start” problem of the recommender
system. In this situation, one can think of the semantic layer as being partitioned as
shown in Fig. 4.3. The aggregator is aware of the two methods below. It implements
the method of [48] by selecting recommendations based on distances in the web of
trust.
4.1.1 Semantic Layer
The semantic layer can be further refined as shown in Fig. 4.4.
The bottommost layer deals with information provenance. Authentication
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Figure 4.3: Example of composing the semantic layer with existing methods.
Figure 4.4: Further decomposition of the semantic layer.
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only guarantees that information originates from a particular source. It does not
provide any guarantee on the source’s ability to provide accurate information. For
example, if a principal x claims to provide a file f , the authentication layer can
verify that x has indeed made the claim but the authentication layer cannot verify
whether x can fulfill the claim of providing f . The aim of provenance is to establish
some form of belief to such claims.
The subject of information provenance deals with the history of information.
Of specific interest to trust establishment is the creator of the information and
how the information has been modified since its creation. A way to establish the
validity of information is via institutionalized trust. Information may be reliable if
it originated from a trusted authority.
Above the provenance layer is another layer that comprises of one or more
trust components. A component is a computational model for measuring a spe-
cific facet of the trust establishment process. For example, in the Marsh model,
there is a component each for evaluating risk, competence, utility and importance.
The trust establishment model accommodates multiple components. This allows
different facets of trust to be combined.
Since these components occupy the same layer, they do not support each
other directly. Instead, each component operates independently. This design allows
different existing trust establishment methods to co-exist. For example, in Fig. 4.3,
the trust components are a recommender system and a web of trust. The role of the
aggregator layer is to take the outputs of each component and combine them in a
meaningful way. For example, in Marsh’s model, the aggregator simply gathers all
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the measurements and passes them to the decision function at the evaluation layer,
while in Fig. 4.3, the aggregator takes the recommendations from the recommender
system and uses the trust values from the web of trust to compute recommendations
as described in [48].
4.2 Expanded Trust Establishment Model
Based on the above discussions, the preliminary trust establishment can be
expanded to the model shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: The expanded trust establishment model.
The evaluation layer at the top consists of a decision function, which remains
unchanged from the preliminary model. The expansion of the semantic layer has
already been described. The authentication layer is partitioned into two compo-
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nents: origin authentication and remote attestation. Origin authentication verifies
the information source and the integrity of the information, while remote attestation
verifies the integrity of the software that provides the information.
At the bottom layer, the primitive layer is partitioned into three components.
The first component deals with local knowledge. Local knowledge is stored in a local
database, accessible through query tools, such as SQL. The second component deals
with external knowledge that is on the web. This knowledge can be retrieved pro-
actively using search tools. The external knowledge can also be gathered passively
by collecting information submitted by other principals or through negotiating with
other principals. The third component is the application context which guides the
primitive layer through the information gathering process. Although the modularity
of the model means that each layer hides the implementation details from other
layers, the primitive layer needs to know the type of information to gather. For
example, if the trust components in the semantic layer demands web of trust and
recommender systems information, then the primitive layer can focus the retrieval
efforts on information that are useful to the upper layers. Having some knowledge
of the above layers also helps the primitive layer negotiate with another principal
to agree on the type of information that is required, such as to use PGP PKI rather
than X.509 PKI. The role of the application context is to provide a set of requirement
specifications to guide the primitive layer through the information gathering process.
Each component of the model supports a null algorithm, which simply passes
information through the component without any processing. For example, if the se-
mantic layer consists of only one trust component, there is no need for an aggregator
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to model this situation, the aggregator is said to implement the null algorithm.
One component that is missing in the model is the capacity for learning. Learn-
ing can help refine the components of the trust establishment model. Since the focus
of this dissertation is on the security of trust establishment, learning is omitted. In
the future, learning can be incorporated into the semantic layer.
4.3 Implementation Framework
The modular design of the trust establishment model provides a natural way
to implement a trust establishment method. Each layer is implemented as a soft-
ware component. A trust establishment implementation is simply a composition
of different software components. A more challenging problem is to describe the
interface of these software components so that different components can be “glued”
together.
One approach is similar to programming with API, where each software com-
ponent lists a set of inputs, outputs and their data types. However, this abstracts
away the semantics of the information that flows in and out of each component. For
example, consider the evaluation layer implementing Marsh’s cooperation threshold
function. The inputs will be a set of real numbers and the outputs will be a boolean
value. The semantics of the inputs and outputs are lost. This can be a problem if
the inputs or outputs involve complex data types. For example, to measure compe-
tence, the trust component may require some digital credentials issued by certain
parties. It is difficult to describe the input in terms of data type in this case. The
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type of the credential has to be specified, such as X.509 or SDSI/SPKI certificate.
A data type for each possible type of credential has to be defined. To make things
worse, it is also necessary to standardize the definitions of these complex data types,
otherwise, it is difficult for different components to work together. For example, the
developer of the evaluation layer may provide a definition of a digital credential data
type while another developer of a trust component may provide another definition
of the same digital credentials in a different manner. Although these two compo-
nents define the same domain of knowledge (digital credentials), they cannot work
together due to the difference in how the definitions are implemented.
Semantic web ontology provides a natural way to solve this problem. Different
software components can be composed together by defining the interfaces using
ontology. For example, the concept of digital credentials can be described using an
ontology language, such as Web Ontology Language (OWL) [69]. In this way, each
component can describe the inputs and outputs by referring to the ontology. To take
it one step further, one can envision each layer to be a semantic web service. The
OWL-S [71] language provides an ontology for describing services. A web service
provides some computational functionality that can be utilized over the web. For
example, a web service for the authentication layer may provide services to verify
information integrity and origin. In order to invoke a service, the service provider
will have to provide a set of invocation methods, and the service description for
the service consumer. A semantic web service provides these descriptions using the
OWL-S language so that the descriptions can be processed by a machine. Using
OWL-S, a web service has to provide a service profile, service model and service
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grounding.
The service profile describes the functionality of the service, the limitations,
quality and conditions for using the service. This allows a service consumer to
determine whether the service meets his needs.
The service model describes how to use the service. It specifies how to request
the service and the outcomes that will occur under specific conditions. This set
of descriptions allows a service user to have a more detailed information about
the service, to compose multiple services to perform a task, to coordinate different
events, and to monitor the execution of the service.
While the service model describes how to use the service, the service grounding
provides a concrete description for using a service. It specifies the communication
protocol, message formats and the addressing issues.
With each layer being implemented as a service, the trust establishment in-
volves identifying the suitable services for each layer and composes these services to
form a trust establishment method.
The semantic web also provides a reasoning platform for supporting prove-
nance. For example, the TRELLIS system [27] provides tools to allow collaborative
annotation of information. Users can add annotations to web resources which may
indicate the accuracy of the resource itself or of the creator of the resource. These
annotations can allow other users to derive how much to trust the information con-
tained in a web resource. Besides annotation, the semantic web also supports the
derivation of trust from social networks [28]. Trust derived from social networks can
be used to determine the trustworthiness in the creator of a web resource.
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4.3.1 Example
To illustrate the implementation framework, consider the scenario where Alice
wishes to search for an interior designer. To do so, she uses a web service that
advertises her request on the Internet, as well as her list of requirements, among
which may include the credentials of the designer and references.
Suppose Bob and Carol respond to the advertisement with their signed cre-
dentials and signed references as required by Alice. The credentials and references
can be expressed as statements using OWL ontology. For example, the trust on-
tology 1 can be used to express the reference information, such as, “Joe trusts Bob
highly regarding interior design.” The statements can then be represented as named
graphs [15], which can be signed. These pieces of information are passed to the au-
thentication layer.
The authentication verifies the source and integrity of the statements. For
example, if Bob claims the statement “Bob has Bobcredential”, then the authentication
layer verifies that the statement originates from Bob and the content of the statement
has not been changed. Depending on the type of key used to sign the statement,
the relevant authentication service is selected. For example, if Bob’s statement is
signed using RSA key and Carol uses DSA signatures, then the web service that is
capable of verifying RSA signature is chosen for Bob’s statements while a service
capable of verifying DSA signature is chosen for Carol. Note that the authentication
in this example does not deal with timeliness of information. An adversary may be
1Trust ontology: http://trust.mindswap.org/ont/trust.owl
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able to replay old statements from Bob. To provide a freshness guarantee, Alice
will have to instruct the responders to send the relevant claims to a trusted web
service that authenticates the timeliness of the information using more sophisticated
authentication protocols, such as Kerberos [52].
Upon successful authentication, the authenticated statements are passed to
the provenance layer. The provenance layer can verify the credential statements,
by retrieving the credentials through the URI in the statements (recall that the
credentials are expressed in OWL). The credentials can be examined to verify their
validity. For example, a web service specializing in interior design schools can check
whether the issuer of Bob’s credentials is an accredited institution and whether the
credentials are still valid. The provenance web service may not be able to verify the
validity of the reference information. Consider the statement “Joe trusts Bob highly
regarding interior design.” While an authentication service can verify that Joe has
indeed claimed that statement, a provenance service is unable to verify whether Joe
is telling the truth. Information provenance requires trust anchors that determine
which principals can be trusted. Therefore unless there is information available that
establish Joe as an authority on interior design (perhaps Joe is a known expert), or
some trusted principal can vouch for Joe, nothing can be known about the truth of
the references. For example, if the social network of Alice is known, and Joe is a
friend (neighbor) of Alice in the social network, then the provenance layer may infer
that Joe is telling the truth, especially if Joe is a friend of Alice and is unlikely to
lie to Alice.
At the trust component layer, suppose Alice chooses a reputation system and a
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recommender system component. The reputation system provides the reputations of
the credential issuers, while the recommender system provides similarity measures
between Alice and the reference providers. Suppose the reputation system rates
Bob’s credential issuer with 0.8 and Carol’s credential issuer as 0.6. Also suppose
the similarity measure between Alice and Joe, who provides reference for Bob, is 0.7,
where the bigger the rating, the more the similarity. The similarity measure between
Alice and James, who provides reference for Carol, is 0.9. The aggregator combines
these ratings to measure Bob and Carol’s competence by multiplying their respective
ratings from the two trust components. This results in Bob having a competence
rating of 0.56 while Carol’s competence rating is 0.54. The evaluation layer selects
Bob due to Bob having a higher competence.
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Chapter 5
Security of Trust Establishment
5.1 Robust Trust Establishment
The bottom layer of the trust establishment model represents the environment
where information is gathered. The gathered information may contain noise since
anything can happen to information as the information moves across the network.
Internal knowledge too can be corrupted if an attacker can compromise the local
storage and modify the information. For simplicity, lets assume that local storage is
secure, using secure storage solutions such as a trusted platform [2] or an encrypted
storage [10, 53]. The authentication layer attempts to remove some of the noise
from the external information by removing security problems, such as information
tampering, information replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Also, the use of a
PKI can also provide confidentiality services and strong identities. In addition,
remote attestation can also verify the integrity of the software running on machines
that participate in the networks. When attempting to define security, the focus will
be on the semantic layer and above. In practice, authentication services are not
always available. However, security research on authentication is well established
and the security problems of authentication are well known [14, 51, 30, 70] and
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well researched. As such, authentication challenges are not the main concern of the
dissertation. Instead, the authentication layer is assumed to employ one of the well
known techniques to address authentication challenges.
At the semantic and evaluation layers, the security challenge is to prevent
adversaries from gaining trust. Trust components rely on information to make
trust decisions. As explained in the previous chapters, even in the presence of an
authentication layer, adversaries may still be able to manipulate information so that
he can be perceived as trustworthy. Therefore, security of trust establishment can
be based on how easy it is for adversaries to gain trust.
In an ideal setting, a trust establishment method should establish trust with
an honest principal and it should distrust a malicious principal. In reality, there are
false positives (malicious principals identified as honest) and false negatives (honest
principals identified as malicious). The presence of false positives and false negatives
is a security concern since it allows malicious principals to be trusted and it denies
honest principals from being trusted. Therefore, one can think of defining security
in terms of how well a trust establishment process can distinguish between honest
and malicious principals. The lower the false positive and false negative rates, the
more secure a trust establishment method is.
More formally, given a context C, let Π(p, q) be a trust establishment method
with p, q as principals, such that one of them is honest while the other is malicious.
The ultimate goal of Π is to determine which principals can be trusted. The context
C provides information that supports Π’s decision making. Formally, a generic trust
establishment method Π can be described as follows:
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1. Randomly select two principals p and q, from C, such that one of them is
honest while the other is malicious.
2. Given p, q as inputs, Π(p, q) repeatedly make any number of queries to C.
3. Π(p, q) outputs the identity of the malicious principal.
In [1], the term, “robustness” is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Robustness: the degree to which a system operates correctly in the
presence of exceptional inputs or stress environmental conditions.
In the context of trust establishment, the robustness of a trust establishment
method, Π, is the degree to which it establishes trust correctly in the presence of
malicious principals. This degree of correctness corresponds to the probability that
Π outputs the correct answer. Π is said to be robust if it can output the correct
answer with a high probability. Conversely, Π is not robust if the probability is low.
Since the upper bound of the probability is 1, the closer the probability is to 1, the
more robust Π is. Similarly, the probability of 0 can be used as the lower bound.
However, one can achieve a tighter bound by considering the case of a random
trust establishment method which guesses the output randomly, based on uniform
probability distribution over random coin tosses. In this case, the random trust
establishment method tosses a coin randomly. If the outcome is heads, the method
outputs p, otherwise, it outputs q. The possible outcomes are (Head, p is malicious),
(Tail, p is malicious), (Head, q is malicious), and (Tail, q is malicious). Therefore,
the random trust establishment method produces the correct output with the prob-
ability of 1
2
. Any other trust establishment method must be more robust than the
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random method, otherwise, it defeats the computational efforts involved in establish-
ing trust. Therefore, the probability of 1
2
is used as a lower bound in the definition
of robustness.
Although the above definition only involves two principals p and q, the defi-
nition can be extended to include multiple principals. In the general case, consider
a set of principals where n are honest and m are malicious. Then the n
n+m
is the
lower bound probability for measuring robustness.
The goal of an adversary is to lower Π′s probability of producing the correct
output. The more robust Π is, the more resilient it is. Therefore, security of a trust
establishment method can be defined by the robustness of the method.
To understand the robustness of a trust establishment method, it is necessary
to understand the capabilities of the adversaries. The application context in which
a trust establishment method is used defines a set of actions that participants can
perform. Since the adversaries are participants, they are capable of performing
these actions. It is interesting to know how adversaries can take advantage of these
actions to gain trust. Therefore, given Π and a set of actions permitted by an
application context, the interesting question is whether there exists any adversarial
algorithms, where each algorithm is a sequence of actions permitted by the context,
such that Π is not robust. Besides the set of actions permitted by the application
context, the adversaries are also capable of actions that are outside the scope of
the context, such as compromising a participant’s computer system or performing
denial of service attacks. However, such attacks fall under the domain of systems
and network security where there may be appropriate solutions to deal with such
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attacks. For example, research efforts in trusted computing and secure programming
may help to protect systems from being compromised. On the other hand, there are
very little research efforts on how adversaries can take advantage of the permitted
actions to gain trust. In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, most research
efforts treat security of trust establishment in an ad hoc manner by only addressing
specific problems without much justification as to why such problems are chosen and
whether their works are secure against other types of attacks. As such, the analysis
of the robustness of a trust establishment method focuses only on how adversaries
can exploit the allowed actions to gain trust.
5.2 Security of Reputation Systems
As mentioned previously, reputation systems are popularly used for establish-
ing trust in decentralized environments. Therefore, reputation systems provide an
interesting subject for security analysis, as well as for illustrating the analytical
techniques.
Based on the above definition of security, it is easy to show that reputation
systems are not robust. Consider the reputation system, Πrep(p, q) for some context
C. The generic definition of a reputation system can be described as follows:
1. Query C about p and q’s reputation.
2. If the reputation of p is greater than the reputation of q, output p. Else,
output q.
To define an adversary algorithm, the first step is to model the application con-
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text. Since the interest is in decentralized environments, P2P file sharing is chosen
as an example for illustrative purposes. The context can be represented by a set of
principals P . Each principal p ∈ P maintains a state variable outcomep = {+,−}.
This state variable represents the outcome of p’s participation in an action. If the
outcome of performing an action is positive to p, then outcomep = +. Similarly, if
the outcome is negative to p, then outcomep = −. The model can be completed by
defining the actions permitted by the application. Without going into specific details
pertaining to a particular P2P application, P2P file sharing applications generally
are comprised of the following basic actions: Join(p), Leave(p), + Action(p, q) and
− Action(p, q).
The Join(p) and Leave(p) actions describe a principal, p, joining and leaving
the C. + Action(p, q) and − Action(p, q) describe principal p providing a positive
and negative action towards principal q respectively. A positive action is one that
demonstrates good behavior as intended by the application, while a negative action
is one that shows malicious intent. As an example, consider a simple file sharing
scenario where p requests to download a file from q. This request action can be
interpreted as a positive action (since there is nothing malicious about requesting
a file download from the point of view of a file sharing application), represented
by + Action(p, q). The response from q can be either + Action(q, p) if q sends an
correct file, or − Action(q, p) if q sends an incorrect file.
Each action is associated with a set of pre- and post-conditions. The pre-
conditions of an action specify the conditions in which an action can be carried
out. These conditions are defined in terms of the states of the application. The
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post-conditions of an action described the new state of the system as a result of
performing the action. An action, together with its pre and post conditions can
be expressed in the form of Hoare triples [34]: {X}Y {Z}, where Y represents an
action, X and Z represent the pre and post conditions of the action respectively.
Formally, the Hoare triples of the actions in application C can be described as:
{p /∈ P}Join(p){p ∈ P} (5.1)
{p ∈ P}Leave(p){p /∈ P} (5.2)
{p, q ∈ P}+ Action(p, q){outcomep = +, outcomeq = +} (5.3)
{p, q ∈ P} − Action(p, q){outcomep = +, outcomeq = −} (5.4)
After defining the application context, similar steps can be used to define the
trust establishment method within the context. This example describes a reputation
system, Πrep. It consists of a set R where rp ∈ R represents the reputation of
a principal p ∈ P . The actions of a generic reputation system can be described
by the following: GetRep(p) and Update(p, q). The action GetRep(p) returns the
reputation of a principal p, while Update(p, q) represents the action where p updates
the reputation of q to obtain a new reputation r′q. Formally, these actions can be
described using Hoare triples:
{}GetRep(p){} (5.5)
{+ Action(q, p) ∨ − Action(q, p)}Update(p, q){(r′q < rq) ∨ (r′q = rq) ∨ (r′q > rq)}
(5.6)
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The GetRep(p) action does not affect any state of the reputation system.
The Update(p, q) action requires q to have performed either a positive or negative
action. The result of an update is such that the new reputation of q, r′q, may
increase or decrease, or even remain unchanged to capture the situation where p
does not provide feedback. Notice that {− Action(q, p)}Update(p, q){r′q > rq} and
{+ Action(q, p)}Update(p, q){r′q < rq} are valid actions. This describes the problem
where users may not provide feedback honestly.
Having defined both the application and the trust establishment method to be
used within the application, the next step is to define the coupling of actions from
the application and trust establishment method. A coupling is a rule, represented
by ai → aj. The rule states that if action ai occurs, then eventually, aj will occur.
The rule does not imply that aj will occur immediately after the completion of ai.
It only states aj will occur some time after the completion of ai. In the example,
the following rule is defined:
(+ Action(p, q) ∨ − Action(p, q)) → Update(q, p) (5.7)
This rule states that if p executes a positive or negative action to q, eventually q
will update p’s reputation. This rule is consistent with the pre-conditions of the
Update(p, q) action. All actions, positive or negative, lead to an update of reputa-
tion. The event where q does not provide feedback is modeled by an Update(p, q)
action resulting in r′q = rq.
Based the above models, an adversary, adv ∈ P can perform the following








+_Action(adv,q), for any principal q;
Until GoodEnough;
-_Action(adv,q’), for any principal q’;
Leave(adv);
}
GoodEnough is a condition chosen by adv to determine when to stop perform-
ing positive actions. The condition is satisfied if Πrep cannot distinguish between
adv and an honest principal. The execution of a positive action will lead to the
update of adv’s reputation as defined by rule 5.2. If the majority positive actions
lead to increase in reputation, repeated execution of positive actions will lead to
an increase in adv’s reputation in the long run. Since reputation information is
public (obtained by performing Getrep()), an adversary knows exactly how much
reputation he is required to accumulate in order to be indistinguishable from an
honest principal. Therefore, an adversary knows when GoodEnough is satisfied.
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When the adversary exits from the loop, the adversary has already accumulated
sufficient reputation such that Πrep cannot distinguish between an adversary and an
honest principal. Therefore, given adv and hon, where hon is an honest principal,
Πrep(adv, hon) is unable to output the correct identity of the adversary with a high
probability.
5.3 Application Specific Exploits
Recall that one of the security concerns is the accuracy of the information
used for making trust decisions. The analysis in the previous section shows that
adversaries can control their reputation scores to gain trust. The analysis is done
without details of the application context. Instead, the actions of the application are
simply described as positive or negative actions. Therefore, the adversary algorithm,
ADV () from the previous section is due to the flaw of reputation systems in general.
ADV () exists whenever reputation systems are used, regardless of the application
context.
This section builds on the previous section by considering application context
in greater details. By applying the same techniques, flaws in application contexts
can be discovered. Using P2P file sharing as an example, the model for application
context C from the previous section can be expanded by replacing + Action(p, q)
and − Action(p, q) with concrete protocol actions.
Let p be the file requesting peer and q be the file providing peer. Also, let s
represents the system. The system is an abstraction of the essential services available
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in a P2P file sharing application. For example, different P2P file sharing applications
have different protocols for finding, storing and downloading files. In this model,
these services are assumed to be provided by the system, s. The definition of s does
not place any assumption about the structure of the P2P network. The network may
have a semi-decentralized structure, such as the Napster [67] network architecture,
where there is a centralized server that provides file location services. In the case
of Napster, s represents the centralized server. The network may also be a totally
decentralized network, such as Gnutella [41] which requires the cooperation of peers
to locate files. In this situation, s is the group of peers that cooperate to provide
the services (s ⊆ P − {p, q}).
Assuming that peers p, q, s have already joined the P2P network (p, q, s ∈
P ). Then a generic P2P file sharing application can be described as a series of
interactions between p, q, s in the sequence shown in Fig 5.1.
+1. p → s : Query
+/− 2. s → p : Response
+/− 3. p : q = Πrep(Response)
+4. p → q : Request
+5. q → p : Upload
+/− 6. p : V erify
+7. p → s : Update(p, q)
Figure 5.1: A generic P2P file sharing protocol.
Each of the steps in Fig. 5.1 is an action of the P2P file sharing application.
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Peer p sends a query to the system for a file. The exact details of the file does
not matter to the security analysis. The system responds with a set of peers who
have the file. In step 3, p engages the reputation trust establishment method to
identify the peer to download the file from. Steps 4 and 5 correspond to the file
transfer phase where p requests to download from the provider q and q uploads the
file to p. Let “NULL” represent a special file that represents an event where q does
not upload anything to p. In this sense, an upload is always guaranteed to take
place. In step 6, p verifies the downloaded file from q and updates q’s reputation in
step 7. The verification in step 6 checks that the content of the downloaded file is
correct. A file is correct if its content is what p expects. Otherwise it is incorrect.
For example, if p downloads a song, then p expects to hear the song in step 6. The
terms “authentic” and “inauthentic” are also used in [40] to describe a file that is
correct and incorrect respectively. However, to avoid confusion with authentication
services at the authentication layer, these terms are not used in this dissertation.
The sequence of actions in Fig. 5.1 constitutes a single transaction. Within a
single transaction, the actions of the transaction take place in sequence, that is:
Step i → Step i + 1. (5.8)
No peers in P is able to execute these actions out of sequence. However, recall that
step i + 1 does not necessary take place immediately after the completion of step i.
In fact, there may be a time lag in between two consecutive steps of the protocol. In
addition, a peer may be involved in multiple transactions such that the executions
of the actions from different transactions may be interleaved by a peer. Timing and
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concurrency issues are often red flags for race conditions. Therefore, the analysis
will have to check for race conditions. To facilitate the checking for race conditions,
define ti to be the time just before step i of a transaction is about to be executed and
t′i be the time just after the execution of step i. Then, the execution of a transaction
must satisfy the following timing constraint:
t′i ≤ ti+1. (5.9)
A generic protocol is sufficient for security because the implementation details
of each individual protocol do not affect the security analysis. For example, the
results of the security analysis is independent of how files are distributed or how
files are located. It is assumed that s provides these services. However, it is not
assumed that s provides these services reliably. The advantage of using a generic
protocol instead of specific application protocols is to allow the analytical results to
be applicable to as many specific applications as possible. In this way, the analysis
results can be applied to any P2P file sharing applications that follow the same
pattern described by the generic protocol. In fact, the results are also applicable to
any applications that can be abstracted into the above pattern. For example, the
protocol for resource sharing in P2P networks can be described by the same generic
protocol. The only difference is in step 5 where a requested resource is granted
instead of Upload().
In Fig. 5.1, each step is annotated to indicate whether it is a positive or
negative action. The annotations are done from the perspective of p. Therefore, all
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actions originating from p are positive actions. The rest of the actions can either
be positive or negative. Step 5 is considered a positive action because the upload
is always guaranteed to take place. The outcomes of steps 3 and 6 depend on the
output of these steps. p expects q to be an honest user as selected by the reputation
system in step 3. The outcome for step 3 is positive if q is indeed honest and the
outcome is negative if q is an adversary. Similarly, a successful verification in step
6 results in step 6 being a positive action and a failed verification means that step
6 is a negative action.
The goal of any rational participant of an application is assumed to achieve
positive outcomes, otherwise, it makes no sense to participate. Therefore, the secu-
rity goal of an application can be described informally by the invariant: “p believes
that the outcome of each action is positive”. To ensure that the invariant holds, p
must be able to establish that an action leads to positive outcome. The goal of the
analysis is to verify that this invariant holds throughout the execution of a trans-
action. Before expressing this invariant formally, it is necessary to introduce some
extra notations and to explain the approach to analysis.
The establishment of beliefs is commonly used to verify security protocols. A
main usage of belief logic in security is to verify authentication protocols. Among
the various methods, BAN logic [14] is perhaps the most well-known method. BAN
logic expresses authentication goals as a set of beliefs, such as “p believes that q says
x” expresses the belief in the origin of an item x. However, the language of BAN
logic only supports the analysis of authentication protocol. To support reasoning
about the outcomes of an action, new notations and inference rules have to be
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introduced.
5.3.1 Brief Review of BAN
As the name implies, Extended BAN (ExBAN) is an extension of BAN. There-
fore, before introducing ExBAN, it is necessary to understand some of the funda-
mental concepts of BAN. First, the objective of BAN is to prove whether a particular
belief can be established. For this purpose, the “believes” notation, |≡ , expresses
the establishment of a belief. More specifically:
Definition 3 p |≡x: p believes x, or p would be entitled to believe x.
This notation means that the principal p may act as though x is true, where x can be
anything, including predicates, information and digital artifacts. The concept of be-
lief is time sensitive since belief can change over time. In BAN logic, any established
beliefs are only valid for the current transaction in which they are established.
Authentication typically involves exchange of challenges and responses over
the network. When a principal receives a message over a network, this can be
expressed using the “sees” notation:
Definition 4 p / x: Someone has sent a message containing x to p, who can read
an repeat x.
If the origin of a message can be identified, this can be expressed by the “once
said” notation:
Definition 5 p |∼x: p at some time sent a message containing x. It is not known
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whether the message is sent some time ago or during the current run of the protocol,
but it is known that p believed in x at the time p sent the message.
The important point about the “once said” notation is the time when the
message is sent is unknown. If the x is not sent during the current run, then there
is a possibility that p may no longer believe in x during the current run. To express
messages that are valid in the current run, the “fresh” notation is used:
Definition 6 ](x): x has not been sent in any messages at any time before the
current run of the protocol.
Another relevant notation is the jurisdiction notation, |⇒ . The jurisdiction
notation in BAN logic expresses the powers of an authority:
Definition 7 p |⇒ x: p has jurisdiction over x.
This can be interpreted to mean that the principal p is an authority on x and should
be trusted on this matter. The concept of jurisdiction is similar to institutionalized
trust mentioned in Chapter 2.
Jurisdiction rule allows beliefs to be established:
Definition 8 Jurisdiction rule: If p believes q to be an authority over x (p |≡ (q |⇒ x)),
and p is convinced that q believes in x, then p also believes in x:
p |≡ (q |⇒x), p |≡ (q |≡x)
p |≡x .
The jurisdiction rule expresses the type of trust that is similar to Barber’s
view of trust as a form of expectation. Principal p is willing to believe in x because
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p expects q to dispense his duties faithfully. Since the purpose of BAN is to serve as
a tool for analyzing authentication protocols, the jurisdiction notation is typically
used to declare the identity of certificate authorities, while the jurisdiction rule is
typically used to establish beliefs in public key ownership:
p |≡ (ca |⇒ pkq7→ q), p |≡ (ca |≡ pkq7→ q)
p |≡ pkq7→ q
This means that if p believes ca to be the authority over public key ownership,
and if p knows that ca believes that q owns pkq (
pkq7→ q), then p believes that q owns
pkq. p |≡ (ca |≡ pkq7→ q) can be established when p verifies q’s public key certificate
issued and signed by ca.
When a principal p receives a message from q, the authentication layer can
verify the message origin and integrity, as well as timeliness of the message based
on cryptographic keys and a random nonce. This is represented in BAN by the
message meaning rules and the nonce verification rule:
Definition 9 Message meaning rule (using public key cryptography):
p |≡ pkq7→ q, p / {x}pk−1q
p |≡ q |∼x .
Definition 10 Nonce verification rule:
p |≡ ](x), p |≡ q |∼x
p |≡ q |≡x .
The message meaning rule explains how to derive the belief in the origin of
messages. In Definition 9, if p believes that pkq is the public key of q (
pkq7→ q) and p
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sees a message signed with the signature key of q, then p believes that q once said
x.
While the message meaning rule captures the idea that the successful verifi-
cation of a signed message leads to the conclusion about the message origin and
integrity of the message, it is unknown whether the message is current or is it a
replayed message. To derive the belief in the timeliness of the message, the nonce
verification rule states that if p believes that the message x is fresh, and p believes
that q once said x, then p believes that q believes in x. p can determine that x is
fresh if x contains a random nonce that is known to p to be recent.
5.3.2 ExBAN (Extended BAN)
While BAN is designed for analyzing authentication protocols, the idea of
ExBAN is to use similar techniques to reason about trust establishment within an
application context. To do so, ExBAN introduces new notation and rules for analyz-
ing trust establishment. Referring to the trust establishment model, authentication
is a component of the model, whose role is to verify the origin, integrity and timeli-
ness of information. Therefore, BAN is relevant to trust establishment as a tool for
analyzing the authentication layer. By using BAN, one can determine the authen-
ticity of the information that reaches the semantic layer. The role of ExBAN is to
continue the analysis at the semantic layer.
To represent trust in a principal, ExBAN introduces the concepts of trusted
predicate and trusted principal:
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Definition 11 T (q, x): q is trusted on x.
Definition 12 p |≡T (q, x): p trusts q over x.
Jurisdiction in BAN expresses a special form of trusted principal. As explained
earlier, jurisdiction is simply an expression of institutionalized trust in an authority
(an authority over key and name binding in BAN). Therefore, if p believes that q
has jurisdiction over x, this implies that p trusts q on x:
p |≡ (q |⇒x) ⇒ p |≡T (q, x). (5.10)
However, the converse is not true. That is:
p |≡T (q, x) ; p |≡ (q |⇒x). (5.11)
This is because p may decide to trust q on x, even though q is not an authority
over x. For example, consider a social network scenario where p trusts q because
q is a friend. In decentralized environments, trusted principals is more important
than jurisdiction due to the lack of authorities in these environments. The pres-
ence of trusted principal is important for trust establishment, otherwise, the trust
establishment process may involve traversing a potentially endless chain of trust
relationships. For example, in a reputation system, to determine which principal to
trust depends on the robustness of the reputation system. The robustness of reputa-
tion systems in turn relies upon the trustworthiness of the principals who provided
feedback. One can then continue to determine the trustworthiness of each principal
who provided feedback and so on. However, establishing the trustworthiness of each
principal may not be possible since there may not be sufficient information to verify
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each and every principal that provides feedback. Moreover, this is a potentially
computationally intensive process. To avoid this work, most trust establishment
methods terminate at a particular stage and take a “leap of faith.” For example,
many reputation systems do not go beyond verifying each of the principals who
provided feedback. Instead, it is taken as faith that the majority of the feedback
is accurate such that the inaccurate feedback does not have significant impact on
the actual reputation. In this example, the principals who provide feedback are the
trusted principals. Obviously, such “leaps of faith” can be exploited by adversaries.
In authentication protocols, the honesty of a principal is not a problem. A
digital signature serves as a piece of non-repudiable evidence about the origin and
integrity of the information. More importantly, authentication protocols assumed
that there are authorities that can prosecute an errant principal based on the non-
repudiable evidences. In the absence of an authority in decentralized environments,
non-repudiable evidence is not useful due to the lack of authorities to enforce good
behavior. Therefore, in decentralized environments, honesty of principals becomes
a concern. To model the honesty aspect, a stricter definition of belief is required.
Let Kp represents the set of knowledge belonging to p. Then honesty is modeled by:
Definition 13 p
h
|≡ x: p is honest about x, such that if p
h
|≡ x ⇔ x ∈ Kp.
To establish the honesty of q’s belief, ExBAN introduces the trust inference
rule:
Definition 14 Trust inference rule:





The trust inference rule explains that if p trusts q on x and p believes that x
originates from q and x is current, then p believes that q is honest about q. From
Definition 13, p also believes that x belongs to q’s knowledge.
5.3.3 Application Security Analysis Using ExBAN
Returning to the problem of analyzing the robustness of reputation systems
in P2P file sharing, the invariant introduced earlier can be expressed using ExBAN:
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 :
p |≡ (outcomep = +) at ti ⇒ p |≡ (outcomep = +) at t′i
∧ (5.12)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 :
p |≡ (outcomep = +) at t′i ⇒ p |≡ (outcomep = +) at ti+1.
The first part of Invariant 5.12 states that if p believes that the outcome is ‘+’
before executing step i, then p still believes that the outcome is ‘+’ after executing
step i. The second part states that if p believes that the outcome is ‘+’ after
executing step i, then p still believes that the outcome is ‘+’ just before executing
step i + 1.
In Fig. 5.1, the steps of a P2P file sharing application are annotated to indicate
whether the step results in a positive or negative outcome. The annotations are
created from the perspective of p. Therefore, steps originating from p result in
positive outcome. For these steps, the outcome is ‘+’ before and after executing
these steps, since p trusts messages originating from p . The focus of the analysis
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will be on steps annotated with ‘+/-’, which are steps 2, 3 and 6. For step 2 , the
outcome is considered to be positive if p can believe that the sender is honest about
the semantics of the message while for steps 3 and 6, the outcome is positive if the
computations performed by p produce “positive” results.
Lets take step 2 into consideration first. A positive outcome is defined as one
where the information contained in Response is accurate (the information source is
honest). This can be expressed as:
p |≡ outcomep = + ⇔ p |≡ s
h
|≡ Response. (5.13)
To determine whether the invariant holds after the execution of step 2, one
can show whether p |≡ s
h
|≡ Response holds at the end of executing step 2. Using
the trust inference rule, p |≡ s
h
|≡ Response can be achieved if p
h
|≡ T (s,Respond)
and p |≡ s |≡Respond. Recall that the semantic of p |≡ s |≡Respond simply refers
to information origin and information timeliness. Therefore, the establishment of
the condition can be achieved using authentication techniques. If the authentica-
tion layer of the trust establishment model can provide the necessary guarantees
(analyzed with BAN logic), then this condition can be achieved.
In the case of a centralized protocol, an authentication between p and s can
verify that Response comes from s and it is current. However, s is not the in-
formation origin. s provides a centralized storage for the information contained
in Response, such as the identity of peers who have the file, and their reputation
ratings. In this case, s is simply reproducing the information in the storage and
therefore, p |≡ s
h
|≡ Response cannot hold, since Response is not in the knowledge
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of s.
In the case of a decentralized protocol, responses are solicited from multiple
peers in the network. In this case, s represent a union of peers who contributed
to Response. This includes peers who are willing to share the file and also peers
who provide feedback to the reputations of the responding peers. To authenticate s
means to authenticate each of these peers. Therefore, suppose s consists of a set of
peers {p1, . . . , pn} who contributed to Response, then
p |≡T ((p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn), Response), p |≡ (p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn) |≡Response
p |≡ (p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn)
h
|≡ Response .
Assuming that the authentication layer provides authentication services (other
than null authentication protocol), each of the pi can be authenticated individually
to establish p |≡ (p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn) |≡Response. The remaining question is whether
p |≡T ((p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn), Response) can be established. Assuming all the peers who
respond can be authenticated, the invariant holds for step 2 if p trusts all the peers
in {p1, . . . , pn}. Since p |≡T ((p1∧ . . .∧ pn), Response) is the trust assumption of the
application context, whether this can hold depends on the context. For the case of
P2P file sharing, in general, p is not expected to trust every peer in the set.
For step 3, the outcome is positive if the reputation system can predict the
behavior of peers accurately. The presence of an adversary algorithm presented
above demonstrates that a reputation system can fail and therefore, the invariant
does not hold for step 3.
Finally for step 6, a positive outcome is achieved by the successful verification
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of the received file. If p requests a file f and q sends f ′, then
outcomep = + ⇔ f = f ′.
V erify in step 6 requires the inspection of f ′. Very often, this requires manual
inspection of f ′ by going through the entire content of f ′ to be sure that the f ′ is
correct. For example, if the file is a text file, p will have to read the entire file to be
sure that the file is correct. Since q has the freedom of choosing any file to send to
p, the invariant is not guaranteed to hold.
The above discussions address the first part of the invariant which requires the
execution of all the actions to uphold a positive outcome. The second part of the
invariant requires the outcome to remain positive in between the execution of all
actions. Within a transaction, no other actions take place in between the actions of
two steps. Therefore if outcomep is positive at t
′
i, what causes outcomep to become
negative at ti+1? The P2P file sharing application consists of multiple transactions
taking place at the same time and these transactions share global information. In
the case of this model, the information is ri, the reputation of a peer i. A transaction
may make changes to information used by another transaction, resulting in a race
condition. In the P2P file sharing protocol, reputation is obtained by p at t′2 and
used by p at t3. Since the actions are not atomic, the reputation ratings obtained at
t′2 may have changed at t3. This is potentially a problem if the peer is deemed to be
trustworthy at t′2, but at t3, the peer’s reputation falls below an acceptable threshold.
In fact, an adversary can exploit the non-atomicity of the actions to delay the update
of his reputation. Recall that the V erify action requires manual inspection of the
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entire file. Manual inspection takes time. For example, a five minutes mp3 music file
requires five minutes to verify its correctness. Therefore, even when an adversary has
sent an incorrect file, this attack is not discovered immediately, giving an adversary
a window of opportunity to attack other peers using his outdated reputation score.
Therefore, the second invariant cannot be guaranteed to hold too.
5.4 Adversarial Behavior Modeling
The adversary model describes the various behaviors of an adversary that
can affect both the security of a trust establishment method and the application
context. The analysis from the previous sections provide the information to model
an adversary’s behaviors.
The adversary algorithm, ADV () constructed previously is one of the com-
ponent of the model. ADV () is due to the nature of reputation systems, where
an adversary can accumulate sufficient reputation. The deployment of a reputa-
tion system within an application leads to more security problems. In the above
example, the potential exploits of a P2P file sharing are in steps 2, 3, 6 as well as
race conditions. The exploits of steps 3 and 6 are the consequences of the lack of
robustness of the reputation system (ADV ()) to select an honest peer, resulting in
the downloading of an incorrect file.
The exploit of step 2 can further affect the robustness of the reputation sys-
tem. This exploit is due to the possible lack of accuracy in the information that




P2P file sharing application Accumulate sufficient reputation.
P2P file sharing application Provide incorrect files.
P2P file sharing application Delay reputation updates.
Table 5.1: Adversary model for reputation systems in a P2P file sharing application.
fect the robustness of the reputation system by delaying the availability of accurate
information.
Since trust establishment is dependent of the quality of the input information,
the adversary model describes how an adversary can gain trust based on what an
adversary can do to the inputs, rather than specific attacks. For example, the
analysis for the reputation systems within a P2P file sharing can be described in
Table 5.4.
In Table 5.4, the target column identifies the area where adversaries can at-
tack. For example, accumulating sufficient reputation can be achieved by exploiting
reputation systems with ADV (), or by causing inaccurate feedback in file sharing
applications. In fact the first class of attack can be achieved by numerous methods,
including malicious collectives [40], Sybil attacks [22], and so on. The second class
of behavior describes an adversary’s ability to send an incorrect file, regardless of
his reputation. The third class of attack is to exploit the race conditions of the
application. Notice that there are various methods to achieve each attack class.
However, all the methods for a single class share a common behavior described
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by the class. For example, ADV () and malicious collectives all lead to inaccurate
reputation scores. The reason for describing classes of attacks rather than specific
attacks is that the list of possible attacks for a behavior class is potentially large.
Moreover, there may be attacks that are currently unknown. Therefore, it is infea-
sible to describe all possible forms of attacks. Since all attacks of a class leads to
the same consequence, it is not necessary to know the specifics. In the future, if a
new form of attack is available, and if this new attack belongs to a known attack
class, then the effect of this new attack is already known.
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Chapter 6
Trust Establishment With Accountability
The previous chapter demonstrates the security problems of establishing trust
with reputation systems in P2P file sharing. The adversary model provides an
understanding of the capabilities of the adversaries. With this understanding, this
chapter proceeds to describe a solution to improve the robustness of reputation
systems.
It is shown that the actions of both the reputation system and the application
can be exploited by adversaries to gain trust. Since these actions are essential to the
proper functioning of the reputation system and the application, it is not possible
to remove these actions or to restrict access to these actions. For example, it is
not possible to prevent principals from building good reputations by behaving well,
otherwise, it defeats the whole purpose of using reputation systems. Therefore, the
design of a robust solution must not rely on inhibiting these capabilities from the
participating principals. Instead, a solution has to accommodate such situations.
The design philosophy behind the solution is “if something bad happens, then even-
tually, something good will happen.” In other words, the approach to the solution
is to allow recovery from attacks.
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6.1 Motivation
eBay is probably one of the most well-known applications that uses a reputa-
tion system. The popularity of eBay suggests that its method of handling fraud is
successful to a certain extent. Besides providing a reputation mechanism, eBay sup-
plements its reputation systems with different protection measures, such as dispute
resolution, fraud protection and even refers a fraudulent seller to law enforcement
agencies. While these measures do not prevent fraud from happening, they do pro-
vide some means of recovering from a fraud. In fact, such recovery measures are
very common in modern societies. For example, the policies of video rental stores
are designed to accommodate failures by requiring customers to have a valid credit
card so that in the event where customers do not return their rented items, their
credit card accounts are charged. Such practices impose accountability on the prin-
cipals involved. That is, while principals are free to do what they want, they have to
answer for their own actions. When things do not go accordingly to an agreement,
the errant party can be held responsible. This may include monetary compensation
or even legal actions.
While accountability is widely practiced, it is a challenge to enforce in a de-
centralized environment, due to the lack of an authority to enforce rules. Another
challenge posed by a decentralized environment is the lack of strong identities to
identify principals.
However, the reality of the situation can be described by the accountability
model in Fig. 6.1 where the dotted lines link a physical person to his online alter ego.
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As shown in the diagram, the physical users are bounded by laws and social order.
The social order corresponds to Barber’s definition of trust where each member
of a society is expected to carry out specific roles in a competent manner. While
decentralized networks mirror an open world model where there are no authorities
to monitor and control the activities of the participants, the real physical persons
behind these online entities exist in a world that is governed by laws and social order.
Accountability can be enforced if an online entity can be linked to a physical identity.
When such linkage can be established, the principal can be held accountable for any
malicious deeds, based on non-repudiable evidences collected by the authentication
layer.
Figure 6.1: Accountability model where each online identity is related to a person
in the real world.
P2P networks have a unique property that makes it relatively easy to establish
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accountability. While P2P networks are often described as decentralized networks,
they are actually build on top of the Internet. Therefore, it is possible to take ad-
vantage of this unique property to establish accountability. Consider a peer p who
wants to download an academic paper. Besides using reputation to decide on the
file provider, p may want to reduce the risk of downloading viruses by choosing to
only download from peers who are researchers. The idea behind this policy is that
researchers are more likely to have a correct copy of the paper, and more important,
the knowledge that the file provider is a researcher can allow p to take action, such
as filing a complaint to the provider’s employers. To select a provider, p must have
the means to verify that the provider satisfies p’s policy and p must also establish
a means to locate the physical identity of the principal that provides the file. A
traditional approach is for a provider, q, to acquire credentials (perhaps SPKI/SDSI
credentials [23]) that can attest to q’s occupation and affiliation. However, a peer
will have to obtain these credentials in advance and this requires the peer to predict
the type of credentials that are needed for his future transactions. Alternatively,
P2P users can make use of the physical network to access the massive amount of
information on the web. Many Internet users have home pages, blogs or social net-
work profiles that can serve as starting points to gather accountability information.
Returning to the example, if p knows the home page of a file provider q, then based
on the URL of the home page, p may established that q is affiliated with a research
laboratory. However, the information does not establish the fact that q is a re-
searcher. This may be established through other means, such as searching for q’s
publication track records. Should q send a correct file to p, p is able to identify q’s
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physical identity, locate q and the necessary authority that q answers to.
6.2 Security Analysis
To analyze the security of using accountability, the same approach from the
previous chapter is used. First, the trust establishment method is analyzed on its
own, without regard to the application context. Then, the deployment of the trust
establishment method is taken into consideration.
The intuition behind accountability is simple, a malicious peer does not want
to be accountable for his actions and will therefore attempt to hide information that
allows him to be traced. On the other hand, an honest user may be willing to take
responsibility for his action. This willingness to be accountable can allow the honest
user to be trusted. Based on this intuition, one can distinguish honest users from
malicious ones based on whether accountability can be established or not.
6.2.1 Robustness of Reputation System With Accountability
To demonstrate how accountability can improve robustness, let Πrep(p, q)
′ be
a reputation system that has been reinforced with accountability. Once again, let
C be a given context. Πrep(p, q)
′ can be described as follows:
1. Query C about p and q’s reputation.
2. Establish p and q’s accountability.
3. Output the peer who can be held accountable and who has a higher reputation,
otherwise output the peer with higher reputation .
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As an example, let rp and rq be the reputation of p and q respectively, such
that rp > rq . If there is sufficient information to establish the accountability of both
p and q, then Πrep(p, q)
′ outputs p. Similarly, if there is insufficient information to
establish the accountability of both p and q, then the output is p. If accountability
can only be established on one of p or q , then that principal is chosen.
Assuming p is the correct answer, let acctp represents a predicate that is true
if principal p can be held accountable, and false otherwise. Since all principals make
their own decisions about whether to provide accountability information, acctp and
acctq are independent variables, for p 6= q. Also, let α be the probability that there
exists information that can be used to hold a malicious peer accountable, while β
is the probability that no accountability information is available for an honest peer.
Since an adversary is assumed to have the ability to accumulate good reputation
that is indistinguishable from the reputation of an honest principal, both rp and rq
have an equal chance of being greater than the other. The robustness of Π′rep(p, q)
is dependent on α and β:
Prob(Πrep(p, q)
′ = p) = Prob(acctp ∧ acctq ∧ rp > rq)
+Prob(acctp ∧ ¬acctq)




+ (1− β)(1− α) + β(1− α)
2
= 1− α + β
2
,
When the sum of α and β is close to 1, then the probability of Πrep(p, q)
′
producing the correct answer is close to 1
2
, which is not robust. However, Πrep(p, q)
′
91
can be robust if the sum of α and β is small enough. In the next chapter, experiments
will be described to determine the appropriate values of α and β.
The robustness of using accountability as a trust establishment method de-
pends on two factors. First, adversaries are unwilling to be responsible for any
attacks and therefore, adversaries are reluctant to associate their online identities
to their physical identities. Therefore, α may be a small value. Second, since honest
principals are not going to commit any malicious acts, they have little to lose by
revealing some information that can be used to establish accountability. Revealing
some information for identifying physical computer users may violate the privacy of
the users. However, each user has the choice to determine the amount of information
he or she wishes to release. Moreover, the popularity of blogs and social network
profiles suggests that plenty of information regarding average Internet users is al-
ready available, and so is the willingness of Internet users to provide information
about themselves. The amount of information to release is determined by their own
level of comfort. For example, some users have no problem posting their photos on
the web, while some may be more reserved about posting their photos. Based on
this observation, β may be a small value. Therefore, these observations support the
feasibility of establishing accountability on the Internet. Even without information
in the form of blogs or social network profiles, one may make use of information
such as domain names found on email addresses (excluding free, web based emails)
or URLs to associate Internet users with some organizations.
Freeloader is a common problem in P2P networks. In the case of file sharing,
there is very little incentive for a peer, q, to share a file. On top of that, q will have
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to reveal some information to provide accountability so that q may be chosen. This
makes the incentive to share files even lower. However, the problem of freeloading
can be mitigated by providing incentives for peers to share a file. For example, in
[24] the reputation of peers can affect their abilities to download a file. This provides
incentives for peers to share a file and enhance their reputations so that they can
download files in the future.
6.2.2 Robustness of Reputation System With Accountability in a
P2P Network
The use of accountability in trust establishment serves as a “safety net,” so
that should a transaction go bad, there are some means to recover from it. With
this in mind, the security objective has changed. In this case, the requirement is
that if at time t, where t1 ≤ t ≤ t′7, outcomep = −, then eventually at time t′,
such that t′ > t′7, outcomep = +. In the event that the reputation system selects
a malicious peer, if the malicious peer can be held accountable, and assuming that
there exists an authority outside of the P2P network to prosecute the errant peer,
then eventually, outcomep = +. Similarly, if an honest peer is chosen, if the honest
user can be held accountable, then eventually, outcomep = +. The only situation
when the condition cannot be satisfied is when accountability cannot be established.
The availability of accountability information is critical to the security of the
P2P file sharing application. An adversary may pretend to be honest by providing
false accountability information that belongs to another peer. To avoid this, the
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authentication layer has to verify the ownership of such information. In the next
section, an implementation design is laid out. Based on this design, authentication
methods are suggested.
6.3 Semantic Web Enabled Trust Establishment
This section describes an implementation design to support accountability
in trust establishment. Since the establishment of accountability requires some
information gathering efforts, the design requires access to information from the
web. Although P2P networks are logically decentralized, they can benefit from this
solution since physically, P2P networks are overlaid on top of the Internet. Access
to information on the web is not necessary for establishing accountability if there
are sufficient information residing in decentralized networks.
In addition, this design is based on the assumption that most peers (probability
of 1− β) have information on the web that can be linked to a physical identity. As
previously mentioned, the success of social networks and blogs on the web suggests
that this is a reasonable assumption. Even if a peer does not have any information,
it is easy to create one using some of the popular social network applications.
Central to the idea of gathering information is to determine what type of
information to gather. While a user can gather information by surfing the web, it
is a tedious process, especially if the information available can be potentially large.
To automate this process, the information has to be described in a format that can
be processed by a computer. The natural solution to this is to use semantic web
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ontology to markup the information.
6.3.1 Identity
The popularity of blogs and social network sites, such as MySpace or Facebook,
means that there is plenty of information about a person on the web. A convenient
way to link an online pseudonym to a physical identity is to use the Uniform Resource
Identifier(URI) of an online profile as the online identity. Since a pseudonym is a
string of characters, an URI can be used as the pseudonym of a peer in P2P networks.
If a user does not have an existing profile, it is also easy to create one. Therefore,
the use of URIs as pseudonyms can be easily adopted without additional software
or hardware. For simplicity, the focus of this dissertation will be on social network
profiles. The same line of reasoning can be applied to blogs or home pages. Moreover,
the use of social network profiles has an additional advantage of tapping into existing
trust relationships among Internet users which is based on friendship. These trust
relationships can be used as a basis for the trust assumptions (p |≡T (q, x)) presented
in the previous chapter.
While there are numerous social network sites available, the use of semantic
web means that the Friend-of-a-Friend (FOAF)1 is the natural format for repre-
senting social network profiles. FOAF is an ontology based on the semantic web
ontology language, OWL. The FOAF ontology models a social network by describ-
ing people, organizations and their relationships. For example, the foaf:Person class
describes a person while the property, foaf:name, describes a person’s name. The
1FOAF Project: http://www.foaf-project.org
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foaf:knows relationship can be used to express friendship. In the syntax of OWL,
the term after the colon identifies a class (Person) or a property of a class (name).
These terms are defined in the name space indicated before the colon (foaf ). For
more information on the FOAF ontology, please refer to [13]. Since FOAF is based
on OWL, one can take advantage of the extensibility of OWL to enhance the basic
FOAF ontology with domain-specific knowledge.
Creating a FOAF profile is easy, as it does not require knowledge about OWL.
To create a profile, simply go to the FOAF project web site to fill up an online form.
The OWL code will be generated automatically. This code can then be copied and
published on the Internet. Unlike other popular social network applications, FOAF
does not use a central storage for storing FOAF profiles. It is up to a user to
decide the location to publish his own profile. Moreover, the information belongs to
the users and any machine capable of understanding OWL can process the FOAF
profile. In comparison, the information in many social network applications belongs
to the application proprietor and cannot be exported in machine processable format
legally.
To link FOAF profiles to peers in P2P networks, the URI where a FOAF
profile is hosted is used as a peer’s pseudonym. A person may have multiple FOAF
profiles. It is up to the person to decide which profile is to be associated with the
pseudonym. For example, a person may use a profile that describes his research
activities when sharing research papers, while a profile which describes the social
activities of the same person can be used for sharing files of other nature. The
OWL language allows two FOAF profiles to be linked to the same person by using
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the owl:sameAs property. A person with multiple FOAF profiles may make use of
this to link all profiles belonging to him, allowing a broader search for information.
However, this practice of linking multiple profiles is optional and is completely up
to the individual.
The concept of using identity to enforce accountability shares a common fea-
ture with the OpenID project, 2 which is the use of a URI as identity. However,
the motivation for using a URI as identity is different in these two schemes. For the
OpenID project, the primary motivation is to provide convenience to authenticate
users by using a single identity and a single password to log onto various web sites.
In addition, it also allows a user to prove ownership of the web site pointed to by
the identity. For this work, the motivation for using URI as identity is to facilitate
the gathering of information that can be used to achieve accountability. Therefore,
an OpenID can be used as an identity for trust establishment if the URI points to
information that can allow one to establish accountability. In fact, the latest FOAF
ontology supports the use of OpenID.
The use of information to establish accountability may cause concerns about
the privacy of users. However, privacy and trust are often in conflict where the
establishment of trust in a principal requires the release of knowledge about the
principal, which results in the loss of privacy [65]. In this case, users give up some
privacy in exchange for trust. In this work, the owner of a profile has full control
of what information to be made available. Therefore, the owner can decide on the
amount of information to release. The use of a social network profile for information
2OpenID: http://openid.net”
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gathering is non-invasive in the sense that the only information gathered are those
that are already available in the web. However, this does not prevent a principal
from publishing information regarding another principal on his own site.
6.3.2 Authentication
Since anyone can claim any URI as identity, it is necessary to authenticate
the ownership of a URI. When a URI is presented as a pseudonym, the authenti-
cation layer has to authenticate the ownership of the URI. The most obvious way
is through cryptographic means. The Web-of-Trust (WOT) Ontology 3 allows one
to attach digital signatures on semantic web documents to prove ownership of the
documents. In addition, this also allows one to verify that the document has not
been modified. A disadvantage of this approach is that the verifier is made to verify
digital signatures, which is a relatively expensive operation. This may allow an ad-
versary to carry out denial-of-access attack by presenting many URIs for the verifier
to verify.
The extensibility of the OWL language means that the FOAF ontology can be
extended to describe the cryptographic keys of the owner of the profile. This allows
the profile owner to attach his public key to the profile. By doing so, a standard
challenge and response authentication protocol can be used to prove that a peer is
the owner of a FOAF profile and also to establish a secure channel for file transfer.
A problem with using a PKI is to establish trust in the public key. For example,
an adversary can duplicate the contents of another profile. To claim ownership
3WOT Ontology: http://xmlns.com/wot/0.1/
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to the duplicated profile, the adversary replaces the public key in the duplicated
profile with his own. The adversary can then sign the duplicated document using
the corresponding signature key. Therefore, a certain degree of trust in the public
key has to be established in order for authentication to be meaningful. If the PKI
involved is based on a centralized model, the digital certificate issued by a CA is
used to establish trust in the public key. On the other hand, if a decentralized PKI
is used, then the trust in the public key can be based on the web-of-trust model.
6.3.3 Provenance
If the public key of the owner of a profile is trusted, then the contents of the
profile may be trusted if it is signed by the corresponding private key. However, this
may not be sufficient in some cases, for example, if sufficient trust in the key cannot
be derived. In this case, some additional measures have to be taken.
To illustrate, consider the following example. Suppose a peer is identified
by the URI, “http://www.jdol.net/JDole.owl”. This URI links to a resource with
FOAF properties, foaf:workplaceHomepage and foaf:workInfoHomepage, taking the
values of “www.cs.foo.edu”, and “www.cs.foo.edu/ jdole” respectively. The first
property, foaf:workplaceHomepage, identifies the website of the organization where
the peer is employed, while the foaf:workInfoHomepage is the website that contains
information about the peer’s work. Given these statements, how can one verify their
correctness?
The peer, JDole, can prove the claims in JDole.owl by using digital credentials.
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For example, the employer can issue a signed credential to certify that someone is
an employee. However, a machine is unlikely to be able to process such credentials
as they are designed primarily for humans to read. An obvious solution would be to
express such credentials in a semantic web ontology language (OWL). These OWL
statements can then be signed by the issuer. In this arrangement, the employer is
treated as a credential issuer, certifying the statements. In the above example, the
two properties foaf:workplaceHomepage and foaf:workInfoHomepage can be signed
by the organization identified by the URI “www.cs.foo.edu”. Trust in the employer’s
signature key can be established by the employer’s public key certificate. This
approach is particularly useful if the issuer is a well-established organization, such
as government agencies, universities or corporations with well-established brand
names. A drawback with this approach is that a peer will have to obtain such
credentials in advance.
The above example can be implemented as shown by the snippets of OWL
statements in Fig. 6.2. Lines 1-8 are the contents of a file which describe the work
place information home page of a person. Also included in this block of statements
are annotations which identify the authority who can vouch for the truth of the
statement (line 5), link to the certificate of the authority in line 6 and the signature
of the authority (line 7). A verifier can obtain the public key by following the link in
line 6 to the certificate and verify the signature as pointed by the URI in line 7. A
peer can prove to be the subject of the statement by demonstrating the knowledge of
the secret key that corresponds to the public key found in the certificate mentioned in
line 8. The properties in lines 5-8 are defined in the ontology in the “cred” namespace
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(identified by the fictitious URI, “http://www.credentials.net/Credentials.owl”). In
this ontology, these properties are defined as annotation properties and snippets of
the ontology are described in lines 9-11.
The definition of “hasAuthorityCertificate” states that for line 6 to be valid,
the resource pointed by the URI, “http://www.cs.foo,edu/FOO.owl#FOOCertificate”
must be an instance of “X.509Certificate”. In line 11, the notation “#X.509Certificate”
implies that the definition of “#X.509Certificate” can be located in the current file.
However, its definition is left out in this example.
6.3.4 Information Gathering
A useful piece of information for establishing accountability is one that allows
the owner of the profile to be traced. The basic FOAF ontology allows a user to
describe both the work place home page and the school home page, which can be
used to establish the locality of the user. This can act as a deterrent to prevent
malicious users from attacking since they can be located. In the event of an attack,
the victim can turn to local law enforcement for help. In addition, the FOAF
ontology can be extended to allow victims to announce attacks. For example, one
can define a “victimOf” relationship between two foaf:Person. If p is a victim of
q’s attack, p can announce that he is a victim using the victimOf property.
There exists different forms of social networks on the web. For example, the
FOAF is one social network, while an online discussion forum is another social



























Figure 6.2: Sample OWL statements describing contents of a peer’s FOAF profile
and the “hasAuthorityCertificate” property.
the different networks to be “stitched” together. For example, if semantic web
research is the subject of interest, suppose that q is a potential provider. If q’s
FOAF profile provides a link to q’s profile, which allows someone to establish q’s
contribution in the semantic web research community, some form of accountability
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can be achieved. For example, Flink, which is a social network of semantic web
researcher, provides information such as the research contributions and co-author
relationships within the semantic web research community. If q’s FOAF profile
is linked to his Flink profile, one may establish q’s influence within the research
community. If q is well known within the community, locating q is easy within the
community. Moreover, if q is well respected, q is not likely to risk losing his real life
reputation by carrying out malicious acts. Therefore, these simple observations can
increase the confidence in making trust decisions. Moreover, it is more difficult for
an adversary to gain trust, since the adversary must make significant contributions
in the semantic web research community before he is trusted.
The method of establishing accountability is a passive one that relies on peers
to use URIs to their profiles as identity and to decide on how much information to
release publicly. There may be situations where the profile owner does not release
sufficient information to establish accountability. In this case, an active information
gathering can be done. This involves using search engines, such as Google, or
Swoogle, which is a semantic web search engine to search for relevant information.
For example, if p is a victim of q, this information is not likely to be found in
q’s profile, but p may publish it somewhere in the web. This information may be
retrieved by using a search engine. A problem with using a search engine is that
a search may return a potentially large set of results. It may be computationally
intensive to look through every one of them. Of course, p may bear some grudges
against q and spread lies to hurt q. Therefore, the truthfulness of information still




To validate the solutions presented in the previous chapter, simulations are
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of adding accountability to reputation systems.
The experiments also aim to study the effects of environment variables: the ratio
of good and bad peers, update delays, α and β which determine the availability of
accountability information.
7.1 Experiment Setup
The simulations are conducted on the Query Cycle Simulator [63]. This sim-
ulator provides a platform for simulating file sharing in a P2P network. The Query
Cycle Simulator uses the EigenTrust algorithm for computing the reputation of peers
in the network. Since the primary objective is to demonstrate that accountability
can improve reputation systems, the implementation of the EigenTrust algorithm is
a useful feature of the Query Cycle Simulator.
The basic simulation setup consists of 100 good peers and 20 different file
categories. The files are distributed according to the distribution model in [62],
with each peer being interested in a set of randomly chosen categories.
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The simulation consists of many cycles. In a single cycle, the peers will take
turns selecting a category of interest randomly, followed by choosing a file from that
category randomly. If the peer already has the file, the peer will select another file.
Otherwise, the peer queries the network for the file. Each query message is broad-
casted to the neighboring peers who will forward the message to their neighbors.
The forwarding is controlled by the Time To Live (TTL) value of the query message.
Each time the message is forwarded, the value is decreased by 1. When the value
reaches 0, the message is dropped. The default value of 3 is used in the simulations.
File requesting peers use the EigenTrust reputation system to select file providers.
The simulator provides the following selection strategies: random selection, global
trust deterministic, global trust probabilistic, local trust probabilistic and query re-
sponse time. The random selection and query response time strategies do not take
reputation into account. As the name implies, random selection picks a provider
randomly. The query response time method selects the peer whose response is first
received. Under the EigenTrust reputation scheme, each peer maintains a local
reputation table of peers with whom he has previously interacted. The EigenTrust
algorithm combines all local tables to form a global reputation table. The local
trust selection strategy chooses a peer based on the local reputation table while the
global selection strategy uses the global table. The global and local trust selection
methods can be either probabilistic or deterministic. The probabilistic method as-
signs a probability to each responding peer based on their reputation. Based on
this probability distribution, a provider is randomly chosen. Using the probabilistic
method, even peers with low or no reputation have a chance of being selected. On
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the other hand, the deterministic method simply selects the peer with the highest
reputation. In the experiments, the global trust deterministic method is used as the
selection strategy.
In this experiment, the following selection strategies are used: global trust
deterministic and random selection. The performances of these two stragegies will
be compared to the performance of EigenTrust with accountability. The global trust
deterministic simulates the reputation system modeled in the previous chapters.
Recall that in the definition of robustness, the performance of the random selection
strategy establishes the baseline on whether a trust establishment is robust or not.
Therefore, the use of random strategy in this experiment offers this baseline on
the experiment results: a trust establishment method is not sufficiently robust if it
performs worse than the random strategy.
Once the provider is selected, the requesting peer will request a download.
An honest provider will provide a correct file, while a malicious provider will pro-
vide an incorrect file. If the download attempt fails (incorrect file), the requesting
peer will attempt to download from the next peer in the list of responding peers.
This continues until either the download is successful, or the list of providers is
exhausted. Based on the outcome, the requesting peer will update the trust value
of the providers using the EigenTrust algorithm.
Since the interest of this research is the robustness of trust establishment,
the performance of trust establishment methods can be based on their robustness.
Recall that robustness is a measure of the likelihood of success in distinguishing
between honest and malicious peers. This can be estimated by the total number of
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bad downloads over the total downloads per cycle for all peers:
ρ =
total bad downloads
total bad downloads + total good downloads
. (7.1)
Let this ratio be denoted by ρ. The ratio, ρ measures the percentage of downloads
that are bad. Therefore the trust establishment is less robust for higher values of ρ.
The performance indicator, ρ, is affected by the number of malicious peers. In
an ideal case with no malicious peers, ρ should be 0 or close to 0 in the presence
of errors. To model how the number of malicious peers affect the performance,
malicious peers are introduced into the experiment in incremental steps of 10, while
keeping the number of good peers at 100. By keeping the number of good peers at
100, one can ensure that there are sufficient good peers around to share files. The
number of malicious nodes is represented by µ.
While ρ measures robustness, it does not measure effectiveness. For example
if a trust establishment method results in 100 bad downloads while another method
results in 1000 bad downloads with all other parameters being equal. Also, suppose
that both methods have a bad download rate of 0.5. Both methods are equally
robust. However, the first method is more effective since it only results in 100 bad
downloads. To measure the effectiveness of a trust establishment method, let σ be
the total number of bad downloads in a single cycle.
To study the effects of enhancing reputation systems with accountability, mod-
ifications are made to the simulator as follows. When a peer is presented with a list
of providers, the peer will make three selections. The first selection is based on pick-
ing a peer using the global deterministic strategy, which only considers reputation.
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The second selection method picks the peer with the highest reputation and who
has accountability information. Peers whose accountability cannot be established
are dropped. The ability to establish accountability is controlled by two parameters.
The parameter, α, determines the percentage of malicious peers with accountability
information. Based on the value of α, malicious peers are tagged at the beginning of
the simulation to indicate whether they have accountability information or not. The
second parameter, β, determines the percentage of good peers with accountability
information. Similarly, the good peers are tagged to indicate whether they have ac-
countability information or not. To model the effect where an adversary can delay
the update of reputation, the variable δ represents such delay in terms of number
of cycles. The third selection is to choose a provider randomly.
7.2 Simulation Scenarios
The simulation scenarios are designed to compare the robustness of the four
trust establishment methods mentioned earlier when they are attacked by adver-
saries. The adversary model from Chapter 5 provides an insight to the type of
attacks to consider when designing the scenarios.
The environment variables are µ, α, β and δ. The scenarios will study how
these variables affect the robustness of the trust establishment methods.
Designing simulations can be a challenge. Many research efforts demonstrate
the effectiveness of their trust establishment methods by simulating against various
attack scenarios. As mentioned in Chapter 3 many of these works do not justify that
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their choices of attack scenarios are adequate. For example, the EigenTrust simula-
tion scenarios focus on attackers who form cooperating collectives. However, while
such choices are valid, they are not complete. The analysis in the Chapter 5 reveals
other types of attacks that have not been considered in the EigenTrust research,
such as the race conditions and the adversary’s ability to accumulate sufficient rep-
utation.
In fact, one major difference between the simulations in this dissertation and
those in EigenTrust research [40] is regarding the initial reputation of the adversaries.
In this dissertation, it is assumed that adversaries have already established sufficient
reputation at the beginning of the simulations, while in the EigenTrust simulations,
the adversaries are initialized with neutral reputation scores. The reason for this
difference is because in Chapter 5, it has been established that an adversary has the
capability to accumulate sufficient reputation. Therefore, the interest is to study
how this attack class affects the robustness of the trust establishment methods.
On the other hand, the EigenTrust research focus is to show that it is difficult for
an adversary to gain trust using specific attack methods. However, all they have
achieved is to show that those chosen attacks cannot allow an adversary to build a
good reputation successfully. Unfortunately, they neglect to consider other methods
in which adversaries can gain trust. Therefore, it is unreasonable to claim that
EigenTrust is secure based on their simulation results.
An adversary model can provide insights into how the simulation scenarios
can be designed. Each attack class describes what the adversaries are capable of.




P2P file sharing application Obtain good reputation.
P2P file sharing application Provide incorrect files.
P2P file sharing application Delay reputation updates.
P2P file sharing application Control α.
P2P file sharing application Control β.
Table 7.1: Adversary model for the EigenTrust reputation system with accountabil-
ity (Π′EigenTrust) in a P2P file sharing application.
model for the EigenTrust reputation system (ΠEigenTrust) is similar to the adversary
model in Table 5.4.
For the case of EigenTrust with accountability (Π′EigenTrust), the robustness of
this method is determined by α and β. Assuming an adversary can control these
variables, then the corresponding adversary model can be described in Table 7.2.
Based on the adversary models in Table 5.4 and Table 7.2, all peers are initi-
ated with good reputation scores at the beginning of every simulation. This arrange-
ment simulates the first attack class in both models. In this way, the robustness of
the trust establishment method under such attacks can be observed immediately,
rather than waiting for the malicious peers to accumulate sufficient reputations. In
reality, not all malicious peers will accumulate sufficient reputation before attack-
ing. In the simulations, all malicious peers have accumulated sufficient reputations.
This provides a worst-case scenario to test the robustness of the trust establishment
methods.
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To increase the likelihood of encountering malicious peers, the Query Cycle
simulator inserts malicious peers such that they are neighbors to highly connected
honest peers. To further increase this likelihood, malicious peers are allocated an
average of five neighbors, as opposed to an average of three neighbors for honest
peers.
In addition, the original EigenTrust reputation system is based on the PageR-
ank algorithm by Google. The PageRank algorithm ranks web pages according to
their importance, based on the number of links. Similarly, the EigenTrust algorithm
identifies a set of peers who are deemed to be highly trustworthy and these highly
trustworthy peers have more links to other peers, compared to other ordinary peers.
In this case, these peers have a higher probability of being chosen and can improve
the performance of EigenTrust in terms of reducing the number of inauthentic down-
loads. In the simulations, there are no highly trustworthy peers to give malicious
peers a higher chance of being selected.
Since malicious peers do not have to accumulate sufficient reputation before
attacking, a malicious peer will attack once it has been chosen as a file provider.
The attack comes in the form of sending an incorrect file. An incorrect file is any file
that is not requested by the requesting peer. It may be a file of different content, an
incomplete file or even an executable file containing viruses or malicious software.
The file may also be a “NULL” file to represent the situation where no files are sent.
The above discussion forms the basic attacks used in all simulation scenarios.
Additional scenarios are derived based on the environment variables: µ, α, β and δ.
The first scenario is to investigate how the ratio of good to bad peers, µ, affects the
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performance of the two trust establishment methods: EigenTrust and EigenTrust
with accountability.
The second scenario investigates how different values of α and β affects perfor-
mance. These two variables model the likelihood of establishing accountability. In
order to attack, an adversary needs to establish accountability. However, an adver-
sary does not want to be accountable for his actions and may resort to provide false
information on his profile, or even hijack the profile of another person to present it
as his own. The variable α addresses the above concerns. It controls the number
of adversaries that can convince a verifying peer that accountability information is
present. Similarly, a malicious peer may attempt to remove accountability informa-
tion of other good peers to deny services. In this case, the variable β simulates the
amount of good peers who do not have accountability information. It is also possible
that a good peer may not have sufficient information to establish accountability or
the peer does not wish to disclose too much information.
Finally, the third scenario is to investigate the effects of exploiting the race
condition within the P2P protocol to create delays (δ) in the update of reputation.
7.3 Simulation Results
Simulations are carried out with the scenarios mentioned in the previous sec-
tion. A simulation run consists of 100 cycles. Therefore, each peer has to download
100 files in each simulation run. At the beginning of each run, the network topology
is generated randomly, based on the Power Law distribution [50]. At the end of
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each cycle, the EigenTrust algorithm is run to compute the global reputation of
peers based on the results of previous cycles. Within a simulation run, the variables
and topology of the network remain unchanged. Since the robustness indicator, ρ,
is defined as the ratio of bad downloads to total downloads in a single cycle and a
single run consists of 100 cycles, let ρ be the average of the values of ρ in a single
run. Similarly, define σ to be the average number of bad downloads in a single run.
For each scenario, a simulation run is repeated until the results converged. Let ρi
be the result of the ith run and let Ai be the average of the i runs:
Ai =
ρ1 + . . . + ρi
i
. (7.2)




7.3.1 How µ affects performance
The first scenario studies how the ratio of good to malicious peers affect the
performance, as measured by the average effectiveness per run (σ) and average
robustness per run (ρ). The number of good peers remain at 100, while the number
of malicious peers, µ is initially set to 10. The value of µ is incremented in steps of
10 until µ reaches 120. For each value of µ, simulation runs (100 cycles per run) are
repeated until the results converge. The values of α, β and δ are kept constant at
0.05, 0.05 and 0 respectively.
Fig. 7.1 shows the effectiveness between the four trust establishment method.
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Figure 7.1: Plot showing how the number of malicious peers affects effectiveness.
Without accountability, the addition of malicious peers increases the number of bad
downloads significantly. This is not surprising given that the more the number of
malicious peers, the more the number of bad downloads is expected. Using random
selection as the baseline, the results show that when the malicious peers manage
to establish good reputations, the EigenTrust reputation system is less effective
than random selection. The rate of increase in bad downloads for EigenTrust with
accountability is slower. This is because the accountability method uses the avail-
ability of accountability information to make decision. Therefore, effectiveness is not
determined alone by the number of malicious peers, but by other variables, including
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α and β. This scenario demonstrates the potential of using accountability as a trust
establishment method, provided that α and β values are in the “appropriate” range.
Even when µ > 100, where the number of malicious peers outnumbered the number
of honest peers, the EigenTrust with accountability method is still significantly more
effective than EigenTrust alone.
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Figure 7.2: Plot showing how the number of malicious peers affects robustness.
The results show that accountability can improve the robustness of the Eigen-
Trust reputation system significantly. When 10 malicious peers with good reputa-
tions are introduced into the network, it results in more than half of the downloads
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being incorrect files if only EigenTrust is used. In this case, the reputation system
alone is not robust even when there are relatively few malicious peers (ratio of ma-
licious to honest peers is 1
10
. Using the random selection as the experiment control,
the EigenTrust reputation system is not robust since it performs worse than the
random method. On the other hand, when accountability is used the fraction of
bad download is less than half, even when there are 100 malicious peers.
Referring to Equation 7.1, if the number of bad downloads is significantly
greater than the number of good downloads, ρ approaches to 1. Fig. 7.2 shows that
the EigenTrust method approaches this limit quickly, when the number of malicious
peers reaches 60. Referring to Fig. 7.1, the number of bad downloads increases very
quickly for the EigenTrust method as compared to the EigenTrust with accountabil-
ity method. Therefore, the robustness of the EigenTrust with accountability does
not reach the limit as quickly the EigenTrust method. In fact, with the value of µ
at 120, ρ is only 0.512.
The EigenTrust method is dependent on µ while the EigenTrust with ac-
countability method depends not only on µ but α and β as well. Therefore, the
EigenTrust method is more sensitive to changes in µ as compared to EigenTrust
with accountability.
7.3.2 How α and β affects performance
The next few scenarios aim to observe how trust establishment with account-
ability is affected by the α and β. Firstly, the influence of α is studied by varying
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the value of α in a series of simulations. In these simulations, the values of β and δ
are kept constant at 0.05 and 0 respectively. Different levels of malicious activities
are controlled by setting µ to 10, 30 and 50. The results are presented in Figs. 7.3
and 7.4. Since the EigenTrust only method and random selection are not affected
by the values of α, the results for these methods not expected to vary much.
Consider the case when α is 1. In this case, accountability can be established
for all malicious peers. With β kept at a small value of 0.05, the set of responding
peers being considered for the EigenTrust with accountability method will almost be
the same as the set of responding peers obtained from EigenTrust only method. The
only difference will be due to a small number of honest peers whose accountability
cannot be established. These honest peers are less likely to be selected since Eigen-
Trust with accountability method gives greater priority to peers (even malicious
ones) who can establish accountability. In this case, the EigenTrust with account-
ability method may perform worse than the EigenTrust only method, due to less
choices of honest peers. This is confirmed by the observation that in most cases,
the EigenTrust with accountability method performs better than EigenTrust only in
terms of effectiveness and robustness, but when α is around 0.85, EigenTrust only
outperforms EigenTrust with accountability. The experiments suggest that if less
than 85% of the malicious peers can appear to be accountable, accountability can
be useful for trust establishment. To obtain better results, the simulations suggest
that when the value of α is less than 0.5, significant improvement in performance
can be achieved by using accountability.
When comparing the performance of EigenTrust with accountability with ran-
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dom selection, EigenTrust with accountability only performs better than random
selection for values of α that are less than approximately 25%. This suggests that
a decentralize network that uses accountability to establish trust can accommodate
about 25% of malicious peers who has accountability information.
The number of malicious peers affect the sensitivity to changes in α for both
performance metrics. When there are more malicious peers, changes in α results in
bigger changes in performance. This is due to the number of malicious peers who
can gain trust in the network. For example, if µ is 10, even if α is 0.5, there are
only 5 malicious peers who can gain trust while if µ is 50, then α only has to be as
small as 0.1 to result in 5 malicious peers who can gain trust.
The next series of simulations study the effect of β on the performance of
EigenTrust with accountability. The set-up is similar to the previous simulations,
except that this time, α is kept at a constant value of 0.05 while the value of β
varies. Like before, the number of adversary, µ, is set at 10, 30 and 50.
The effect of different values of β are shown in Figs. 7.5 and 7.6. From Fig. 7.5,
the results suggest that EigenTrust with accountability performs very well in terms
of the number of bad downloads. However, the study of Fig. 7.6 reveals a clearer
picture. At β = 1, the fraction of bad downloads is 1. This can be explained by
Equation 7.1. When all honest peers do not offer any accountability information,
they are not considered for downloads. Therefore, only offers from malicious peers
(who managed to present accountability information) are considered. As a result,
all the download attempts lead to bad downloads. With no good downloads, the
value of ρ is 1. The number of bad downloads is kept at a relatively low level for
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EigenTrust with accountability due to α being assigned a low value of 0.05.
This set of experiments reveals an insight to the influence of α and β. The
value of α has an impact on the effectiveness and robustness of trust establishment
methods. On the other hand, β affects the availability of files. When β gets large,
there are less files available for download. The experiment results suggest that
EigenTrust with accountability performs reasonably well if β is approximately less
than 0.75.
To observe the combination of various values of α and β, simulations are carried
out with different values of µ at 10, 30 and 50. The results are shown in Figs. 7.7
and 7.8. The results suggest that EigenTrust with accountability will perform better
than EigenTrust only if the α and β values are below 0.5. A significant improvement
in performance can be achieved when both α and β are below 0.3.
7.3.3 How δ affects performance
To investigate the effects of delay in the updates of reputation, the simulations
are performed with the number of adversaries set to 10, α and β both having the
value of 0.05 for the EigenTrust only method. The delay, δ is set to 10 runs. After
the 10 runs, the reputation updates for these 10 runs are performed before the rest
of the runs are resumed. It is expected that the number of bad downloads do not
vary much during the period when there is no update of reputation. The results are
shown in Fig 7.9.
The simulation results confirmed the expectations. There is a drop in the
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number of bad files once there is no delay in the updates of reputation. For com-
parison, the results for EigenTrust with accountability are also plotted. Even the
EigenTrust with accountability method is affected by the delays. This is due to some
adversaries having the ability to present accountability information. However, since
the number of bad downloads for EigenTrust with accountability is much lower than
EigenTrust alone, even when there is a delay in updating the reputation of peers, the
number of bad downloads is still significantly lower when compared to EigenTrust
only method.
7.4 Findings
The simulations reveal the promise of using accountability to reinforce repu-
tation systems. In terms of effectiveness, using accountability manages to reduce
the number of bad downloads, improving the overall effectiveness of a P2P file shar-
ing application. Adding accountability to a reputation system also improves the
robustness of reputation systems.
The use of accountability for trust establishment also provides a “safety net”
feature that is not shown by the simulations. For reputation systems in a decen-
tralized network, when bad download occurs, the victim is unable to prosecute the
adversary since the identity of the adversary is hidden behind a pseudonym. The
lack of centralized authorities means that there is no means of linking a pseudonym
to a physical identity. However, the use of accountability attempts to establish a
link between an online identity to a physical identity. Therefore, even in the absence
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of a centralized authority, a victim is able to redress the situation. This ability acts
as a “safety net” for the victim. In addition, it also acts as a deterrent to discourage
malicious activities, since a rational adversary will not want to be held accountable
for their actions.
However, it is anticipated that there are adversaries who can establish account-
ability, such as, by hijacking a legitimate identity. The simulations are designed with
this in mind and they have demonstrated the level of robustness of using account-
ability in the presence of adversarial activities. In general, if µ is a small value, the
use of accountability is able to achieve very good performance in terms of effective-
ness and robustness, even if α and β are relatively higher values. In practice, it is
expected that the value of µ is low. This is because if µ is too high, the presence of
large amount of malicious activities will discourage peers from participating in file
sharing and the P2P file sharing application will cease to be useful. Therefore, the
use of accountability presents a useful method for trust establishment.
Finally, note that the adversary model for reputation systems with account-
ability has more attack classes than the adversary model for reputation systems only.
However, the use of accountability results in more robustness. This shows that the
robustness of trust establishment cannot be judged by the number of attack classes
in the adversary model. Instead, it is the resilience of the trust establishment method
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Figure 7.6: Plot showing how β affects robustness.
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Figure 7.7: Plot showing how the combination of α and β affects effectiveness.
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This dissertation demonstrates the design of robust trust establishment through
the use of accountability. While the simulation results are promising, the effects of
using accountability in real world applications are unknown. The next step in this
research is to investigate the use of accountability for establishing trust in real world
situations.
While the establishment of accountability is facilitated through the use of se-
mantic web enabled web resources, semantic web research is still a relatively new
field with numerous ongoing research. The main obstacle of using semantic web
techniques today is the relatively low adoption rate outside of the research commu-
nity. Besides using semantic web techniques, other technologies may be explored to
seek additional techniques for establishing accountability.
In this dissertation, the main problem of using reputation is that it is easy for
adversaries to build reputations. Future research efforts may investigate methods
to represent reputation as a computational concept, such that it is more difficult
for adversaries to build good reputations. For example, current reputation provides
a single dimensional measure of behavior. This allows adversaries to build good
reputations by actually behaving well initially. However, in real life, reputations
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may not be easily built. For example, reputations of professional workers are built
by performing quality work making it difficult for someone to gain reputation by
doing a relatively small amount of work. One way to mitigate this problem is to view
reputation in multiple aspects. For example, it has been previously mentioned that
a FOAF profile can be extended to include the PGP keys of the profile owner. This
effectively allows one to tap into the PGP web of trust to obtain the trustworthiness
of the profile owner within the PGP web of trust. Similarly, the FOAF profile may
also be linked to some professional network, such as LinkedIn. In this situation,
when presented with the URI of a peer’s FOAF profile, one may access information
in other social networks to evaluate the reputation of the peer. This attempts to
build a global profile of a principal. By doing so, a bad reputation in one network
can affect a principal’s reputation in other networks. This increases the social cost
of committing malicious acts.
Another possible future research direction is to study ways to improve the
performances of trust establishment. One idea is to look into ways to participants
in decentralized networks to self-regulate and to self-organize. For example, one
may utilize the distance between two peers in social networks as an estimate of
trustworthiness. Two peers trust each other if they are neighbors in a social network,
otherwise, the value of trust decays as the distance increases. Using this measure,
one can select its neighbors in decentralized networks based on these trust estimates.
Consider the following scenario where peer p chooses to connect to q, who in turn,
chooses to connect to r. Suppose p issues a query to download a file, the query will
reach r through q. Suppose r responses to the query and sends the response to p
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through q. Since q is connected to r, q considers r to be trustworthy and when q
forwards r’s response to p, q is effectively vouching for r (if q does not trust r, then
q will not be connected to r and will not be able to forward r’s response). Similarly,
since p is connected to q, p trusts the response forwarded by q. There are two
advantages to this form of self-organization. First, malicious peers may be isolated
since malicious peers are surrounded by friends. Second, it may be easier to establish
accountability since peers are surrounded by other peers who are related through
some social relationships. These social relationships can be used for establishing the




Trust establishment in decentralized networks is a challenging task due to
their open nature where anyone can participate freely. It is difficult to enforce ac-
cess control to keep out malicious users. Moreover, the problem is compounded by
the lack of centralized authority to enforce certain rules and regulations, including
managing digital identities and credentials. While the common solution is to turn
to reputation systems for trust establishment, this dissertation has shown that re-
lying on reputation alone is not a secure solution. This work contributes to the
advancement of trust establishment for decentralized networks in two areas: reduc-
ing the complexity of designing trust establishment and improving the security of
trust establishment.
Trust establishment is a complex task with many factors, such as security,
credentials, and policies to consider. An important contribution of this dissertation
is to provide a simple abstract model for trust establishment, as defined by a layered
model in Chapter 4. The model abstracts the complex task of trust establishment
into simpler components. The abstraction of trust establishment is based on the role
of information in trust establishment. The primitive layer addresses the collection of
information, while the authentication and provenance layer verifies authenticity and
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accuracy of the information respectively. The semantic layer interprets the meaning
of the information, such as interpreting the meaning of reputation scores. Finally,
the decision layer determines whether trust is established or not. With these layers
of abstraction, the model identifies the important issues that should be addressed
when designing trust establishment solutions.
The model also recognizes that trust establishment may be dependent on mul-
tiple factors. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.5 where the semantic layer is further
decomposed into different trust components. Examples of trust components include
reputation, recommendation, competency and accountability. An aggregator is re-
sponsible for combining the outputs of these trust components. An advantage of this
model is that it allows existing trust establishment methods to be combined easily
since each existing method can continue to operate independently. This concept
is further demonstrated in this dissertation, where two different trust components,
reputation and accountability, are combined to achieve a more robust solution for
establishing trust in decentralized networks.
Security itself is a complex topic. The meaning of security differs according
to contexts. To be able to discuss security for trust establishment in a meaningful
way, it is necessary to define what security means in the context of trust estab-
lishment. Unfortunately, much existing research defines security based on specific
attacks. While these definitions are valid, the trust establishment model is a generic
model, and therefore, it is necessary to define security in a generic manner. The
trust establishment model contributes to understanding security by identifying the
areas in which security has to be addressed, and the type of security that is needed.
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In the case of the trust establishment model, the authentication layer ensures that
information is originated from a specific source and has not been modified by any
other entities. However, authentication does not guarantee that the content of a
piece of information is correct. This is an important issue for open, decentralized
networks, since the participants may generate false information to gain advantages.
Since the semantic layer is dependent on the accuracy of the information, the se-
curity requirement at the semantic layer can be identified by how adversaries can
manipulate information to gain trust. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on se-
curity at the semantic layer. This dissertation contributes to the security of the
semantic layer in three aspects. First, the meaning of security is defined. Second,
analytical techniques are presented to discover security threats. Third, this disser-
tation demonstrates the design of a secure trust establishment method for a generic
form of file sharing application in decentralized P2P networks.
Robustness is used as a metric for measuring the ability of a trust establish-
ment method to distinguish an honest principal from a malicious principal. A trust
establishment is robust if it can distinguish an honest principal from a malicious
principal with a high enough probability. From the point of view of an adversary, a
robust method requires more effort to gain trust. The measure of robustness thus
serves as the definition of security for trust establishment. As a result of this con-
tribution, it is possible to have a quantifiable measurement of security that can be
used for evaluating and comparing different trust establishment methods. This is
demonstrated in Chapter 5 where it is shown that the use of reputation alone is not
robust.
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Having defined security for trust establishment in terms of robustness, this
dissertation proceeds to describe techniques for measuring the robustness of trust
establishment methods. ExBAN serves as an analytical tool for analyzing the credi-
bility of the information used at the semantic layer. ExBAN is an extension of BAN,
which is based on belief logic. While BAN has been widely used for analyzing au-
thentication protocols to ensure the authenticity and integrity of information, BAN
does not deal with the semantic correctness of the information. The contribution of
ExBAN is to fill this void. As a proof of concept, ExBAN is used to demonstrate
that reputation alone is not robust in Chapter 5.
Based on the analytical results from ExBAN, an adversarial behavior model
can be constructed. This model describes the capabilities of the adversaries with
respect to a trust establishment method. A feature of this model is the use of
generic classes of attacks to describe the capabilities of the adversaries. This is an
important feature because there are too many types of attacks that are available
to the adversaries. Therefore, it is impractical to describe the capabilities of an
adversary based on each and everyone of them. Moreover, there are possible attacks
in the future that are now unknown. Attacks are classified under different classes
according to their effects. Attacks belonging to the same class have the same effects.
For example, this dissertation shows that an adversary model for a reputation system
consists of: manipulating reputation scores, failure to deliver services and to delay
updates of reputation. An additional advantage of using attack classes to describe
an adversary is that when a new type of attack surfaces in the future, its impact to
a trust establishment method is already known if the new attack belongs to one of
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the attack classes described in the adversarial behavior model.
Designing a robust trust establishment method can be a difficult process. The
adversary model contributes to the design of robust trust establishment methods
in two ways. First, by describing the capabilities of an adversary, the pitfalls are
known in advance and additional methods can be deployed to address these pitfalls.
Second, and more important, it provides insights into ways of improving the robust-
ness of trust establishment methods by making use of actions that are beyond the
capabilities of the adversaries. The use of accountability to complement reputation
systems is an example of such design strategy.
While an adversary can gain trust by accumulating sufficient reputation, the
lack of centralized authorities in decentralized networks means that even when ad-
versaries are discovered, there are no authorities to prosecute them. Accountability
addresses these issues. First, even though decentralized networks represent open
world models, the users belong to lawful societies and have to answer to their online
behaviors. By establishing a link between an online identity to its corresponding
physical identity, accountability can be enforced. Moreover, it is difficult for adver-
saries to establish accountability since they do not want to be held responsible for
their malicious activities. Therefore, a trust establishment method can make use
of the establishment of accountability to distinguish between honest and malicious
principals. To establish accountability, this dissertation proposes the use of social
profiles on the Internet.
The effects of using accountability to reinforce reputations are studied in a
series of simulations. Unlike many other works where simulation scenarios are cho-
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sen in an ad hoc manner, the simulation scenarios in this research are chosen based
on the adversary model from ExBAN analysis. The adversary model describes the
capabilities of the adversaries in attacking reputation systems in P2P file sharing
applications. These capabilities are reflected in the design of the simulation sce-
narios. As described in Chapter 7, simulation results show that in the presence of
adversaries, the combination of reputation and accountability is more robust than
the use of reputation alone.
With computing trends moving towards an open, ubiquitous and pervasive
environment, trust establishment becomes critical to secure computing. The results
presented in this dissertation provide a promising step towards achieving the goal of
improving the security of computers in such environments by providing techniques
that contribute to the design of robust trust establishment methods.
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